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RÉSUMÉ 
Les systèmes tuteurs intelligents sont considérés comme un remarquable concentré 
de technologies qui permettent un processus d'apprentissage. Ces systèmes sont capables de 
jouer le rôle d'assistants voire même de tuteur humain. Afin d'y arriver, ces systèmes ont 
besoin de maintenir et d'utiliser une représentation interne de l'environnement. Ainsi, ils 
peuvent tenir compte des évènements passés et présents ainsi que de certains aspects 
socioculturels. Parallèlement à l'évolution dynamique de l'environnement, un agent STr doit 
évoluer en modifiant ses structures et en ajoutant de nouveaux phénomènes. Cette 
importante capacité d'adaptation est observée dans le cas de tuteurs humains. Les humains 
sont capables de gérer toutes ces complexités à l'aide de j'attention et du mécanisme de 
conscience (Baars B. J., 1983, 1988), et (Sloman, A and Chrisley, R., 2003). 
Toutefois, reconstruire et implémenter des capacités humaines dans un agent artificiel est Join 
des possibilités actueJles de la connaissance de même que des machines les plus 
sophistiquées. Pour réaliser un comportement humanoïde dans une machine, ou simplement 
pour mieux comprendre l'adaptabilité et la souplesse humaine, nous avons à développer un 
mécanisme d'apprentissage proche de celui de l'homme. Ce présent travail décrit quelques 
concepts d'apprentissage fondamentaux implémentés dans un agent cognitif autonome, 
nommé CTS (Conscious Tutoring System) développé dans le GDAC (Dubois, D., 2007). 
Nous proposons un modèle qui étend un apprentissage conscient et inconscient afin 
d'accroître J'autonomie de l'agent dans un environnement changeant ainsi que d'améliorer sa 
finesse. 
Les Mots Clé: Apprentissage, conscience, agent cognitif, codelet 
ABSTRACT 
Intelligent tutoring systems (lTS) are considered as a remarkable possibility of 
technology, enhanced learning which are used as assistant and even as an alternative to the 
human tutors. To accomplish this mission they need to maintain and use a representation of 
their environment that may include places, sLlITounding agents (artificial and human), and 
their actions. They can therefore take into account past and present events, and even be 
driven by social concerns. Since dynamic environments evolve, an ITS agent must li.kewise 
evolve to accommodate structural modifications in the environ ment and the addition of new 
phenomena. These iJ!lportant capacities of adaptation are observed in professional human 
tutors. Human being is capable to manage al! mentioned compJexities by the heJp of allen/ion 
and cOl1sciousness mechanism (Baars B. 1., 1983, 1988), and (Sloman, A and Chrisley, R., 
2003). 
However, reconstructing and implementing human capabilities in an artificial agent 
is far from the actual human knowledge and most sophisticated computers capacities. To 
achieve human-like behaviour and adaptation in machines, or simply to better understand 
human adaptability, we have to design human-inspired learning mechanisms. This work 
describes some fundamental Jearning mechanisms implemented in a cognitive autonomous 
agent, CTS (Conscious Tutoring System) developed in GDAC laboratory. (Dubois, D., 2007) 
We propose a modeJ that sustains "conscious" and "unconscious" learning as a means to 
increase the agent's autonomy in a changing cnvironment, and a way to improve its fitness. 
Keywords: Learning, consciousness, Global Workspace theory, cognitive agent, codelet. 
CHAPTER l 
1. Introduction 
Intelligent tutoring systems (lTS) have been used in education about since the late 
1970s. Theil' goal is to making customized lessons or giving feedback to the learner without 
human involvement. In fact, ITS might maintain a separate, individual profile of each learner 
in order ta adapt the learning session to the needs, preferences and to their eurrent 
performance of the learner. Thereon, domain model (expert), learner model, tutor model and 
Educational Psychology (ED) represent the essential subsystems of ITS systems. Therefore, 
design and produce ITS systems needs meticulous caution in terms of knowledge description 
and possible behaviors of experts, learner and tutors to help the learner build its own 
knowledge in a given domain. 
As information services and domains grow, domain knowledge (aIl information and 
elements of a particular domain) and reasoning mechanisms became more complicated. 
However, it is hard to customize and ineorporate the new domains to the existing domain 
knowledge by a system. To challenge with this problem, Newell (Newell, A., 1990) proposed 
a reoriented research on modeling in psychology which capable to unify ail domains. A 
unification of different models may use cognitive architecture. 
Traditional robotics design was centered on having robots carry out specifie tasks. 
Cognitive robotics adds reasoning, deeision making and the ability to cany out certain 
additional tasks when compared to traditional robotics. A cognitive agent requires a central 
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management organization "mini" that includes the roboCs sensory system, perception, 
memories, attention, Learning, action selection and effecters. 
The central management organization is in charge of the overall task assigned to the agent. 
Cognitive agents maintain and use a representation of their environment that may include 
places, surrounding agents (artificial and human), and their actions. They can therefore take 
into account past and present events, and even be driven by social concerns. Since dynarnic 
environments evolve, a cognitive agent must Iikewise evolve to accommodate structural 
modifications in the environment and the addition of new phenomena. To achieve human-like 
behaviour and adaptation in machines, or simply to better understand human adaptability, we 
have to design human-inspired learning mechanisms. 
Our interest in this research is to add learning capabilities ta crs, a generic cognitive 
agent whose architecture is based on functional "cansciausness" mechanisms (Baars, B. J., 
1988). We aim to explain sorne fundamental learning methods realized in a cognitive self­
governing agent, CTS. In doing so, our solution is integrated within an example ITS which 
aims at supporting astronauts training to use a robotic arm. 
Mind (Wikipedia): Refers to the collective aspects of intellect and consciousness which appear in 
certain combination of thought, perception, emotion, will and imagination. 
1 
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1.1 Training the astronallts: our application platform 
A robotic arm was installed on the International Space Station on April 23, 
2001(Figure 1.1), during the STS-100 rrtission. This robotic arm, Canadarm2, was developed 
by the Canadian Space Agency and is a crucial element in assembling the station. Not only is 
it used to transport large loads (e.g. new modules), astronauts also use it as a mobile platform 
wheri they are working outside the station. The Arm can travel "across" the space station 
using the Mobile Based System2, and from one end to the other by attaching the free end of 
Canadarm to the next available tether. 
The Arm's movement can be observed by looking at the three LCD monitors of the 
Robotic WorkStation (RWS). The RWS has two sets of direction controls: a rotational hand 
controller and a translational hand controller. In addition, workstations are equipped with a 
control panel and a laptop computer. 
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Figure 1.1 Robotic arm installed on the International Space Station 
Source : hnp://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/structure/elements/mss.htm1 
2 A work platform that moving along rails covering Ihe "width" of the space station. the Mobile Base System, or MSS, provides 
laierai mobility for Canadarm2 as il traverses the main truss. Il was added to the station during STS·III (assembly tlighl UF·2) 
in June 2002 
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Manipulating the robotic arm is a difficult task, which requires astronauts to undergo a 
serious amount of training. The seven degrees of freedom of the arm is the first difficulty to 
overcome, as it considerably increases the number of possible operations. The second 
difficulty is sight limitation. It is impossible to have an overall view of the station; therefore, 
the astronaut can only see the arm through a "steady climb" camera installed on the station 
and on the Arm. Furthermore, the astronaut must choose among these cameras because there 
are only three screens. Figure 1.2 shows an astronaut manipulating the Arm and the three 
screens of Canadarm's workstation aboard the space station. 
Figure 1.2 Chiao handling the Canadian Arm (Courtesy of NASA) 
The astronaut must avoid moving the Arm in a way that might block it or produce a 
collision with the space station. Blocking is referred to as a singularity and constitutes a 
technical probJem which the astronaut must consider when manipulating the Arm. Beyond 
the main task of manipulation cornes selecting the right cameras. In addition of choosing the 
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best views, the astronaut must readjust the cameras throughout the displacement (or 
movement). Our laboratory, in co-operation with the agency, developed a tutorial system, 
which will alJow astronauts to self-Ieam without human supervision. Professor Nkambou 
(Nkambou, R., et al., 2006), developed an Intelligent Training Robotic Simulator for the 
space station which uses an Innovati ve Path-Planner. The simulator makes it possible for the 
user to test Canadarm in a virtual rnicro-environment and to complete exercises assigned by 
the tutor. The role of the planner is to find a path from a given situation permitting to move 
Canadarm to the assigned destination. Astronauts are therefore provided with various 
contexts in which they can manipulate the Arm. The simulator executes on a standard 
microcomputer. Figure 1.3, shows the interface of the simulator, which reproduce the three 
screens that are available to the astronaut. On each screen, the astronaut can select a camera 
which will post images. In addition, each screen makes it possible to manipulate the viewing 
angles of the cameras. The interface obviously makes it possible to manipulate the arm. This 
is done by first selecting the joint of the arm which the astronaut wishes to move and then by 
swinging the angle of the joint being manipulated by using arrows of the computer keyboard. 
Such handling changes the state of the micro-environment. The effects can be viewed on the 
three screens. 
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Figure 1.3 A screenshot of the simulator showing a plotted path in red 
(Nkambou, R., et al., 2006) 
The astronaut can get a better understanding of what he has accomplished, and of the 
Arm' s position, by viewing the additional information that is posted. For example, in figure 
1.3. a yellow sign at the top of the middle screen indicates that there is a risk of collision. As 
we can see at the bottom right of the manipulations list, joint WY is approaching the 
JEMELMOI module. The virtual non-cognitive tutor integrated with the simulator thereby 
provides guidance in manipulating Canadarm2. It also helps when it traces a possible path ta 
reach the desired final position for Canadarm2. Roman Tutor can provide a set of exercises 
which astronauts can select and use for practice. 
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1.2 Problem statement 
Developing a human-like learning system with the intent of promoting knowledge to 
an individual is an extremely delicate problem. In our case, CTS will help astronauts to learn 
the manipulation of Canadarm2 in a more interactive and humanly tutoring. To do so, the 
agent considers a multitude of aspects: current virtual mjcro-world state (position and 
configuration of Canadarm2), potential dangers, qua lity of learner's actions, Jearner' s 
preferences, learning objectives, and so on. Furthermore, the system must take into account 
the vi l'tuai world technical constraints and multi-media as weil as the psychological and 
cultural aspects brought about by the transmission of knowledge to humans. In human beings, 
consciousness and attention mechanisms help manage these complexities. Such mechanisms 
make humans aware about the real world situation, and permit them to analyze it, to correctly 
resolve unexpected probJems and adapt weil to the unpredictable situations. That is why we 
considered a "conscious" architecture for our tutorial system. 
CTS' is a "conscious" agent, but consciousness without learning, limits the applicability of 
the architecture. Some human-like learning mechanisms that crs can be endowed with to 
perform more accurately are: 
•	 Learning of Environmental Regularities: Producing algorithms which help 
CTS adapt to its environment rather than having a simple input-output 
procedure. CTS can analyze its perceptions and information that appears in 
its working memory; it is also capable of reviewing these concepts. 
•	 Episodic learning: Producing algorithms which give the agent the capability 
of remembering and analyzing the past (events trac king) to extract relevant 
knowledge. It is interested in the when, where and why of an event. 
•	 Procedural learning: An attempt to improve the astronaut's abilities during 
navigation in the virtual environ ment. Using the training algorithms, CTS 
analyzes the astronaut's mistakes and selects an exercise to help him correct 
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them. CTS must be capable of reviewing previous errors (exercises that 
ended dangerously such as space collisions, poor manipulations, and so on). 
We therefore can visualize that a "conscious and learning" architecture is a crucial base for 
a truly intelligent tutoring system. Such an agent shows behaviors that more closely parallels 
that of humans. ln most cases, it should therefore be easier for the learner to interact with this 
agent. Consequently, it is easy to imagine that our architecture could be used for the 
development of another tutoring system. 
1.3 Objective 
This project clearly plans to establish learning algorithms for cognitive intelligent 
agents which directly interact with virtual and human environments. This elaborate work 
aims essentially at expanding Franklin's (Baars, B. J., 1988, 1997; Franklin, S., 2003), agent 
IDA (Intelligent Distribution Agent), to produce some fundamental learning methods in an 
artificial tutoring agent endowed with many mechanisms reproducing human consciousness 
and learning. IDA learns only consciously, but psychological experiments (cited in 
Faghihi,U,. et al., 2007) suggest that the human being is capable of learning consciously and 
unconsciously. Humans may learn in many ways: by looking at something (perceptual 
learning), by doing a task (procedural learning) by 1iving in or remembering an episode 
(episodic learning) and so on. Ali learning mechanisms could happen consciously and 
unconsciously (in parai leI) in a human being. 
In other words, our hope is to define and validate learning meèhanisms inspired by 
human cogni tion as known by psychologicaJ experimentations and philosophical theories. 
Rather than attempting to build and provide a predetermined encyclopedic knowledge for the 
agent, we expressly hope to permit CTS to learn the important rules and concepts that are 
missing in its repertory. 
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lA Methodology 
In order to achieve our goals, we initially chose an existing "conscious" architecture. 
After evaluating several architectures, we decided to base our work on the Learning 
Intelligent Distribution Agent (LIDA) architecture, developed by Stan Franklin at the 
University of Memphis. Our reason was that LIDA is a proven, universal and complete agent 
architecture. LIDA design and construction are based upon IDA with several forms of 
learning (Franklin, S., 2005). IDA was designed for US Navy personnel work (McCauley, L., 
and Franklin, S., 2002). IDA modules comprise: 
"Perception (Zhang, 2., et al,. 1998), numerous types ofmemory (Anwar, A and 
Franklin, S., 2003; Franklin, 5., et al., 2005), consciousness (Bogner, M., et al., 2000), 
action selection (Negatu, A., and Franklin, 5., 2002), constraint satisfaction (Kelemen, 
A., et al., 2002), deliberation and volition (Franklin, S,. 2000). Ali IDA modules are 
based on new AI theories (Hofstadter, D. R., and Mitchell, M., 1994; Jackson, 1. V., 
1987; Kanerva, P., 1988; Drescher, G. L., 1991; Maes, P., 1989)." 
CTS' is a replication of IDA in a very different context: human learning.
 
In this sense, my final goal in this study is to extend CTS with learning capabilities in order
 
to improve its performance. The following steps explain my work:
 
•	 Clarification of the generic notion of consciousness and logically related concepts. 
•	 Illustration of conscious architectures and agents, in order to find pattems of how 
Consciousness cou Id help an agent to learn. 
•	 Identification and implementation of two fundamental types of learning (ail happening 
consciously/unconsciously) to enrich crs knowledge and behaviours: 
a) Learning of Environmental Regularities; 
b) Procedurallearning and creativity; 
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Our central focus in this scientific research is on the basic principJes of Perceptual and 
procedural learning algorithms. This portion of our work focused on the learning of the 
relevant concepts in the environment of the agent and the automation of complex gestures. 
1.5 Document layout 
First of ail, 1 present an overview of the notion of consciousness and Baars' theory 
about consciousness upon which crs' architecture is based on. 
Chapter 2 presents a range of definition, architecture of agents and related domains, 
conscious architectures and intelligent tutorial systems. 
Chapter 3 covers LIDA architecture in depth, allowing the reader to understand its 
functionalities. 
Chapter 4 presents CTS, our "conscious" tutoring agent's architecture and sorne 
fundamental learning mechanisms implemented in this agent. This chapter forms the core of 
this document. 
Chapter 5 gives a comparison between CTS (with its Jearning capabilities) and other 
popuJar agent architecture, as LIDA, BD!, CLARION and ACT-R. 
CHAPTER II 
STATE OF THE ART 
2. Introduction 
As with any other research project, we had a starting point, a multitude of connected works. 
Sorne of the most important aspects will be covered in this chapter. In order to assist the 
reader in better understanding the qualities of our architecture, the first section explains what 
the consciousness is. Then, Baars' theory of the consciousness will be cJarified, the overall 
theory upon which our architecture is based on. We will then provide an overview of learning 
and of machine learning and its major theories before tuming to the general meaning and 
architectures of agents and, its related topies which are the intelligent agents and their 
architectures. LIDA (Franklin, S., et al., 1996-2007) architecture (developed by Stan 
Frankl in's team at the University of Memphis), will be covered in the final section. 
2.1 What is the generic notion of consciousness? 
There are a lot of definitions offered about the concept of consciousness by philosophers and 
well informed experts which after reading and comparing them got me confused. My 
significant concern in this work is not to argue the validity of consciousness, to differentiate 
its characteristic, or even to find the existence of consciousness. 1 use it in a software agent 
for the different kind of learning, because without consciousness, most learning is impossible, 
at least in natural agents. 1 merely plan to show its efficacy for an artificial agent, and how it 
could help different learning mechanisms in crs (Dubois, D., 2007) or any generic artificial 
agent. 
Latest researches in cognitive sciences offer new theories, propose a wealthier, deeper sight 
of consciousness and its usefulness. 1 start by a popular example to explain the meaning of 
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consciousness (after a car accident within one hour he had lost consciousness). A brief 
definition about Consciousness could be explained as follow: 
"Consciousness is regarded to comprise qualities such as subjectivity, self­
awareness, sentience, sapience, and the ability to perceive the reLationship between 
oneself and one's environment. It is a subject of much research in philosophy of 
mind, psychology, neuroscience, and cognitive science. Some philosophers divide 
consciousness into phenomenal consciousness, which is subjective experience itseif, 
and access consciousness, which refers to the universal availability of information to 
processing systems in the brain. Phenomenal consciousness is astate with qualia. 
Phenomenal consciousness is being something and access consciousness is being 
conscious of something. " [Wikipedia} 
AI suggests that a simulation of consciousness can be generated in an artificial being built to 
resemble human cognition. Accordingly, computational mechanisms can provide an agent the 
majority of the same advantages that human being gifted with. 
Franklin (in Franklin, S., et al., 2006) suggested consciousness definition as: 
"Conscious cognition is implemented computationally by way of a broadcast of 
contents from a global workspace, which receives input from the senses and from 
memory (Baars, B. 1. 1988; Franklin, S. Baars, B. J., Rama-murthy, u., & Ventura, 
M., 2005; Franklin, S., 2003)." 
According to this definition to explain how consciousness helps learning, r give a concrete 
example that Dubois (in Dubois, D., 2007) offered in his thesis about a computer 
implementation of consciousness mechanisms. r use and change it to explain how learning 
methods could be integrated to the example. The CPU (the central processor unit) could be 
considered as the conscious part of a computer which processes ail information comjng from 
different parts of the system. This information could be sorne result from queries to a 
database, sorne mathematical computations and so on. Then the CPU causes sorne procedures 
(unconscious processes) to set-off in the computer, which prepare and return results to sorne 
active memory. There, the information becornes available for a new round of conscious 
(aware) processing by the Cpu. The result of the unconscious processes, for instance 
answering the query to the database, came back to consciousness (to the attention of the 
CPU). These active processes may be repeated many times, thus the system should leam 
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them, automate ("compile") them, even remember the answers in instances of stable data. 
Next time, the same query, does not need to be recalculated by the cru, or at least not go 
through ail the steps and cycles through the Cru. In this example ail requests and responses 
might pass by cru, the conscious part of the system which relates ail information and gives 
them to the learning memories for learning. Although learning in CUITent computer 
architectures is possible without consciousness mechanism (in my example, without 
intervention from the CrU), l stress here that we are dutifully explaining a human inspired 
architecture which mandatory must imitate human beings behavior. In fact withou t 
consciousness or cognitive mechanisms, a model may become a simple equation and its 
evaluation becomes a mathematical or numeric equation. 
There are many methods to explain and recreate consciousness; 1 refer reader ta 
Dubois' thesis (Dubois, D., 2007). However, 1 need to explain a specifie, detailed model of 
consciousness that CTS consciousness mechanism is based upon: Baars' Global Workspace 
theory. 
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2.2 Baars' Model 
Baars' model is not an imitation of eonsciousness, but rather a "rigorous seientific 
theory of eonsciousness" (Baars, B. J., 1988). It is a psychological theory. Our explanation is 
intended to allow readers to gain a better understanding of the architecture proposed and 
implemented by Franklin in IDA (and LillA, its successor). l emphasize that my goal at this 
point is to synthesize Baars' model rather than to explain it in details or to bring a new idea 
about consciousness. On the other hand, we will give a metaphoric and broad view of this 
theory. To describe his theory, Baars uses the theatre as a metaphor.The central element of 
this metaphor is "the stage of working memory". The seene represents the working memory 
and the size of the scene is quite limited. ln Baars' model (Baars, B. J., 1988), a large number 
of codelet3 process unconscious treatments and the global workspace synchronizes and 
manages their activities by broadcasting their results throughout the system in order to obtain 
a proper conscious experience (figure 2.1). 
~pecialist 
proc<.::ssors 
Figure 2.1 Global Workspace Barrs' Model 
The scene contents are unconscious. What of it becomes conscious is what comes into 
the spotlight of attention, which walks through the scene. Describing the conscious part of 
3 (Hofstadter, D. R., Mitchell, M., 1994), "a small piece of code executing as an independent thread 
that is specialized for sorne relatively simple task" (Negatu, A., et al2üü6). 
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working memory, Baars wrote: "The thealre has a powerful spotlight of attention. and only 
events in the bright spot on stage are strictly conscious." The actors performing on the scene 
compete to attract the public's attention. To illustrate the competition for consciousness on 
the scene, Baars' includes in his metaphorical work an example of perception. The eyes 
collect detected objects (when they reflect the light that is radiated towards them). It is 
evidenl that recognition is very difficult or impossible when there is insufficient light. In such 
context, the risk of obtaining invalid information for a given context is high. The context can 
include conceptual assumptions that guide our conscious thoughts and the interpretation 
process, even if the assumptions themselves never become conscious. An important element 
of the unconscious context is the director, representing the whole of the executive functions. 
The director knows the current goals of the system, and he guides the attention in working 
memory (and the audience's attention) according to these goals. 
Finally, there is the audience, representing the unconscious processes observed in the 
scene and which react to events .. The audience carries out most of cognitive work, 
unconsciously and with distributed mechanism; only the result of this work goes up on the 
scene to (potentially) become conscious. The structure of these actors might be quite 
complex; together, they create a multimodal event composed by millions of neurons, or 
simple (i.e. a neuron). The work of Baars is broader than this simple metaphor as he recalls 
scientific results which support his theory and draws upon the implications of his hypothesis. 
In the next chapters l will explain how CTS could constantly learn by its needs (in fact 
by its attention requirements). Each time unconscious processes are chosen by attention and 
arrive at the consciolls level, learning mechanisms start examining this information. Learning 
begins with a past experience (an event) or a new event. 
In the next part of this chapter, l wOlild like to describe the generic concept of learning 
and some different type of machine learning methods. 
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2.3 What is learning? 
In 1885, Hermann Ebbinghaus described organized measurement of memory in terms 
of accuracy, development and capacity, as weil as the impact of repetition on memory 
development. Actually, Iearning begins when an activity (for example: an action, observation, 
imitation, etc) Ieads the subject to interact with an external event. Then it could be: 
The process of gaining knowledge or skill and any change in memory (the 
knowledge that is stored in memory). 
•	 The consistent remembering of an event or task. 
•	 Understanding that we have to change our behavior through expenence or 
conditions. 
Any stable modification ln human thinking or behavior by repeating certain 
exercises. 
Reviewing previous experiences and trying to remember corresponding 
knowledge. 
At the same time learning may be influenced by some other criteria as: 
Repetition: With repeated patterns of behavior, we are capable of predicting 
sorne features (learning the regularities). 
•	 Importance: It is very important to remember the essence of each task that we 
execute. 
•	 Order/timing: Trying to remember the when and where or causes of each event 
(Episodic and causal learning). 
•	 Reinforcement: Iearning becomes stronger or weaker with reward or punishment 
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Since, l originally aim to implement different (supervised and unsupervised) kind of 
learning into a conscious agent; it is helpful to have a brief overview to the various types of 
machine learning in the next part. 
2.4 Machine learning 
Machine learning is a branch of artificial intelligent that focuses on algorithms and 
techniques that gives computers reasoning and learning capabilities. 
Sorne types of algorithrns that are organized into taxonomy: 
2.4.1 Supervised learning 
Supervised learning is a machine learning method for producing a function from 
exemplar data. The exemplar data contain pairs of input and desired outputs. As a matter of 
fact, machine inputs and outputs are normally present in supervised learning. The inputs can 
be the vectors, and the task of machine might be to predict or adjust inputs to desire outputs. 
Nonetheless, machines must be capable of predicting unforeseen inputs and outputs. One 
example of supervised learning is "backpropagation". However, to offer a correct answer for 
a given problem one needs to consider the following: 
a) The type of exemplar data's, 
b) Choosing cautiously exemplar data's as weil as desired output for each input, 
c) Choosing an apt learning algorithm for the problem at hand. 
2.4.2 Unsupervised learning 
In this learning, the training data are given to the system just as inputs, and the 
machine learns the correlations between these data on its own. ln fact, the system has no a 
priori idea about outputs. On the other hand, in unsupervised learning, system gathers input 
data in order to use them as random variables. Unsupervised leaming might be used with 
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Bayesian inference4 to produce conditional probabilities. The difference between supervised 
and unsupervised learning is that in an unsupervised machine learning there are no input­
output examples of the training data as is the case in supervised learning. The machine 
accepts the inputs and then attempts to adjust and translate them into a desired output on its 
own, without referring to the viewed? or previous examples. This Jearning is used for 
classification, pattern recognition, among others. 
~ Hebbian Learning: 
Another poputar methodology for unsupervised learning is Hebbian Learning (Hebb, 
D. O., 1949). In this kind of learning we give just input to the system and system learns how 
to cOlTelate between data's and produce outputs (URU). 
" Let us assume that the persistence or repetition of a reverberatory activity (or "trace") 
tends to induce lasting cellular changes that add to ifs stability.... When an axon of cell A is 
near enough to excite a cell Band repeatedly or persistently takes part in firing it, sorne 
growth process or metabolic change takes place in one or both cells such that A 's efficiency, 
as one of the cells firing B, is increased " 
The raie could be explained mathematicaIly by next formula: 
Cl is the learning rate. Ergo, when an input set off an output, system might update the 
connection between two simultaneously active neurons which we will use this method in 
CTS for learning aims lat~r on. 
~ Anti-Hebbian Novelty Filtering: 
4 Bayesian inference (Wikipedia): We use evidence or observation to infer the probability that the
 
hypothesis may be true.
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Hebbian network work properly when system receives input pattern then it set off a 
well-built answer. However, the answer is weak when we introduce new pattern to the 
system. "anti-Hebbian" learning could be produced by alpha constant negation. Sorne 
operational applications of those are: 
"computer security (intrusion detection, network monitoring), machine supervision 
(breakdown detection), stock market supervision (detecting impeding crashes or trade 
irregularities), fraud detection and bio-monitoring, to name afew" (URLl). 
The difference between Hebbian and anti-Hebbian learning models could be 
explained by the fact that the Hebbian models focuses on elements corn mon to ail the input 
patterns (i.e. features). However, the anti-Hebbian model focuses on each component 
attribute to entity patterns rather than their cornillon features. 
2.4.3 Semi-supervised learning 
Semi-supervised learning is a combination of supervised and unsupervised learning. 
For example, it could be "co-training", that training strategy uses different and independent 
collections of examples for each learner during a course. 
2.4.4 Reinforcement learning 
A discussion in reinforcement learning refers to the agent who is free to explore and 
react to a situation within its environment, and subsequently is able to receive positive or 
negative reinforcement. According to the answers (true or false) it gives to the environment, 
the agent will receive positive or negative reinforcement. In this method, environment could 
be considered as a finite-state in the Markov decision process (MDP). Probabilistic theory 
could be used in reinforcement learning to anticipate the agent's subsequent answer in MDP, 
to gives reward to the positive or punishment to the negative answers. A set of environments 
and a set of actions to be ta ken are present in this type oflearning. A set of scalar rewards is 
provided each time the agent makes the best decision within its environment. 
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2.4.5 Case-based reasoning 
Case-based reasoning (CBR) is a recent methodology came up to help the problem 
solving and learning. Cognitive psychological scientists believe that human being lises past 
experiences to solve the new problems (Aamodt, A and Plaza, E., 1994). Accordingly human 
uses various types of knowledge, or use a combination of various types of reasoning methods 
as weil as representations to solve a problem and learn it. Then CBR might be capable to 
basically consolidate general types of knowledge in various forms. As a matter of fact, when 
we challenge with a new problem, we try to solve it by finding a similar past situation, and 
reusing its related information. CBR does not concentrate only on generalization between 
problems and conclusions. Actually, it tries to solve the problem by finding a similar past 
case, and reusing its relevant information facing withjn the new case. Briefly, CBR tries to 
find solutions about, how to utilize specific knowledge about past experiences, and then solve 
the new problem. It also concerns the ways in which systems can learn incrementally. As a 
concrete example we can talk about a physician which is diagnosing a patient. During 
diagnosis and treatment phase, he tries to remember and re-use the past similar symptoms 
treatments for the CUITent case. In fact, Case-based reasoning looked upon as an extension of 
machine learning and its current challenge is finding the general reasoning techniques which 
could improve machine learning models. CBR second important task is offering various 
solutions for extracting pertinent knowledge from the skills; incorpora te them as a case to the 
current knowledge composition and indexing relevant information. Then in this method, each 
time a problem is effectively solved, the know-how about the problem and offered solution 
might be saved to help solving alike problems in the future. When an effort to solve a 
problem fails, the principle causes of fail might be recognized and memorized to stay away 
from the same error in the future. 
After giving some definitions about learning, know it is time to dutifully define the 
agent structure and at least how learning could be integrated to a cognitive agent. 
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2.5 Agents and their architectures 
"There is no universally accepted definition of the lerm agent," (Wooldridge, M., 
1999),The only existing consensus is that the concept of autonomy is essential in defining an 
agent. However, autonomy is a tough concept to get detail accurately. Franklin (in Franklin, 
5,,2006), proposed the following definition: 
"A system embedded in, and part of, an environment, that: 
• senses its environment 
• acls upon il 
• over time 
• in pursuit of ils own agenda 
• so that its actions affect itsfuture sensing," 
An example would be a virus in the Windows operating system that could be activated 
at a precise moment. 
Wooldridge (in Wooldridge, M., 1999) proposed the following definition: "An agent is 
a computer system that is situated in some environment, and that is capable of autonomous 
action in this environ ment in order to meet its design objectives." The key concept in this 
definition is autonomous action, meaning it acts independently, without the supervision and 
support from a human. In addition, an agent must Jearn and adapt to changes within its 
environment. Another characteristic of an agent is its capacity to react and recover from an 
unexpected event. 
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Our interest in a tutoring system is to develop learning mechanisms in an intelligent agent 
that is capable of taldng flexible and autonomous actions. Such an agent should be reactive, 
deliberative, hybrid and cognitive: 
•	 Reactive agent: A purely reactive agent is one whose action depends only on what it 
perceives in the present moment. Such an agent does not store any internaI 
information; neither does it consider the history of its previous actions in the 
decision-making process. Brooks (Brooks, R. A., 1986) proposed the best known 
reactive agent architecture, "subsumption architecture". Inspired by behavior­
based robolics in which complicated intelligent behavior is deconstructed into 
"simple" behavior modules that are organized into properly ordered layers, this 
architecture is based on the idea that rational behavior is the' product of 
interaction with the environment and emerges from the interaction of simpler 
behaviors. That is why the agent contains a whole set of simple rules, each one 
reacting to a situation in the environment. These rules follow a simple form: 
situation --t action. 
Each layer executes one of the agent's specific goals. The upper layers are more 
abstract. The lower layers are considered an adaptative part of the architecture, 
whereas the upper layers manage the circuit taken in executing the order to attain 
the overall objective. Decision making in the upper layer is dependent upon the 
lower layer. No complex reasoning must be undertaken; it is sufficient to check 
the preconditions of the rules. The difficulty with this model is its inability to 
have many layers, as the goals start to meddle with one another, resulting in low 
suppleness at runtime. Another problem noted by Wooldridge (Wooldridge, M., 
1999) is that "they must have sufficient information avaUable in their local 
environment for them to determine an acceptable action." However, making 
decisions in an intelligent tutoring system is based on interaction with students or 
external environment. The tutor cannot know ail there is to know about the 
student to reach a proper decision based on its exterior manifestations, and the 
environment may have hidden elements and aspects. 
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•	 Deliberative agent (Inman, J., Hewitt, c., 1991): These significant groups of agents 
are capable to monitor their environment and make an internai vision of il. They are 
capable to pursue their own goals by internally debating over the issues. 
•	 Hybrid agent (Inman, J., Hewitt, c., 1991): It has a composite behavior of reactive 
and deliberative agents in that it is capable to follow its own strategy. Furthermore, it 
can respond immediateJy with sorne exterior events without thoughtfulness. 
•	 Cognitive agents: Newell (Newell, A., 1990) was the first who offered the primary 
scheme about a cognitive agent, but he had not enough time to gradually develop his 
creative idea. Anderson and Lebiere (Anderson, J. R., Lebiere, c., 2003) eventually 
took his overall view and proposed the Newell test criteria. His criteria divided into 
three major categories(Hélie, S., 2007): 
•	 Biologie plausibility, 
•	 the architecture must result from an evolutionary process, 
•	 Learning (adaptability to its environment). 
Anderson and Lebiere (Anderson, J. R., Lebiere, c., 2003) added sorne other criterions for a 
cognitive agent, such as (HéJie, S., 2007): 
•	 the architecture must be able to operate in real time; 
•	 the architecture must be designed in the fruitful way which supports dynamic 
behaviors in its reactions to the environment (to adapt its behavior according to 
the result of its actions on the world); 
•	 the architecture might use a natural1anguage(to communicate with its 
environment); 
•	 meta-cognition (thinking about thinking that may be used in Jearning). 
Newell (Newell, A., 1990) stated that human beings use symbols as their abstractions. 
Thus, a cognitive architecture must be able to combine the symbols ("chunking") in order to 
facilitate their subsequent uses. Then, human intelligence relies on the enormous basic 
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knowledge. Accordingly, a cognitive architecture should be able to use its basic knowledge to 
form different sorts of learning (for example perceptual and procedural leaming). Newell 
believed that the intelligence is a general function of the built up environment and a cognitive 
architecture must be equivalent to a universal calculation machine (Turing, A. M., 1936). 
Following Newell (Anderson, J. R., Lebiere, c., 2003), and Sun (in Sun, R., 2004) 
proposed its own version of the cognitive architecture. Sun added some specifie types of 
coexistent processes, as explicit/implicit processes. This terminology comes from the 
psychological distinction between implicit and explicit memory. The explicit process refers 
to the factual or declarative or non-procedural knowledge, to which meta-cognition has 
access. For example, the abstract idea that the moon turns around the earth. Implicit processes 
refer to the procedural knowledge that is in a form such that meta-cognition has no access to 
il. For example, how to do cycling and swimming. 
In his model explicit/implicit knowledge's interact in a synergetic way to solve a 
problem and learn a specifie task. A system using these two types of knowledge is more 
efficient than a system using only one or the other of these types of knowledge (Hélie, S., 
2007). 
However, Franklin (in Franklin, S., 2006) uses the term cognition to describe "the 
endless cycle of deciding what to do next ?". LillA, a cognitive agent based on Baars' Global 
Workspace theory, supports some characteristics different from the model proposed by 
Newell, Anderson & Lebiere and Sun. Our task is to try to understand human cognitive 
processes which result in the learning processes, and then implement them at a computational 
level. 
Now, let's give more explanations about, BOl and cognitive agents. 
2.5	 BOl agents 
Belief-Desire-Intention architecture (BOl),(Bratman, M. O., et al., 1988) brings relief 
to those deficiencies. It has some philosophical basis in the theory of human practical 
reasoning. According to this theory, human intentions that are translated into action are 
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constructed by beliefs and desires. The internai state of an agent which uses this architecture 
consists of beliefs, desires and intentions. Belief represents the agent's information status 
about itself and its environ ment, including other agents. Beliefs sometimes include illation 
rules and allow current beliefs to lead to the new beliefs. Desires (or goals) correspond to the 
multiple concurrent aims or situations that the agent would like to fulfill or produce. 
Examples of desires might include finding a good job, buying a house, opening the door. 
Intention represents the agent drive or motivation to approve a behavior. 
The beginning of the execution of the plan or what the agent has decided to perform 
(the goal he has set its mind upon). 
BD! architecture uses a cognitive cycle (see figure 2.2). Ali data entered through 
sensors are revised by the belief revis ion function (brf), which updates the existing beliefs of 
the agent with beliefs obtained from perceptions. For example, Canadarm might dangerously 
approach the station while it is being manipulated by the astronaut. The agent knows through 
its belief that a collision will occur if the astronaut continues his movement. The belief that 
there is a danger of collision is therefore added to the entire set of beliefs, replacing the one 
stating a safe status. This information eventually creates the further belief for the agent that 
the astronaut is a beginner. 
The generate options function then creates options according to the beliefs and 
intention of the agent. This function has two goals: planning, and discovering opportunities. 
Planning makes it possible to determine how the agent can carry out its intentions in the 
current environment (ail the while respecting the belief constraints). The function should 
discover new opportunities provided by the creation of new beliefs. 
In our example, the function generates three new options: "Allow astronaut to 
continue ", "inform astronaut of danger", and "stop the astronaut and remedy the cause of 
the dangerous handling. " 
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Figure 2.2 Cognitive cycle of BD! architecture. (D'Inverno, M., and Kinny, D., 1997). 
The options thereby generated (desires of the agent) are then filtered by a third 
function (filter). This function selects the proper desire and, in the case of a multi-agent 
system, determines which agent will execute it. 
The function is based on the current intentions of the agent as well as its beliefs in 
order to make this choice. In our example, the agent believes that the student is a beginner. It 
also believes that his dangerous behavior must inunediately be remedied. That is why it 
chooses the final options. This choice excludes the first option and renders the second one 
useless (when the exercise is stopped, it is no longer useful to give a warning); hence only the 
third one is retained. This function also re-examines the existing intentions, removing those 
already carried out. It can also disengage the intention that is not helpful or realizable at the 
moment, given its current beliefs. 
"When does an agent disengage itself?" That is a difficult question to answer, as both 
engagement and disengagement of intentions are very important. An agent that disengages 
too quickly may not achieve any of its intentions, whereas an agent that is not disengaged 
will put its energy ioto challenging internaI intentions and soon find itself in a failing 
situation. In general, the agent should re-examine its intentions more often when the 
environment is more volatile. Finally, an action function chooses one of the intentions for 
execution that is readily achievable. 
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The BDI Model is an accredited model in the agent field. It is intuitive, because it 
encompasses human notions of reasoning. In addition, much effort was put into producing a 
formai model for this architecture. The main problem in BD! architecture is that it dismisses 
the influence of emotions on desires and decision-making (Vidal, H. 1., and José, M., 2006). 
2.6 Architecture of cognitive agent 
Cognitive architecture is a design for intelligent agents which exceeds the capabilities of 
mentioned (for example reactive, BDI, etc) architectures. Nowadays, cognitive sciences are 
integrated into several disciplines related to natural cognition (see figure 2.3) such as 
philosophy, psychology, linguistics and neurosciences, as weil as to artificial cognition 
(artificial intelligence and data processing). In fact, cognitive agents' architectures, in 
general, have different characteristics, as we mentioned above they could process information 
by "symbolic computation" in which they manipulate symbols, making tasks possible and 
data easily alterable by substituting one or more mies. These agents sense their environment 
to create information for their own use to spawn actions. Such agents might be equipped with 
short and long-term memory, imagination, prediction, conceptualization, reasoning, 
scheduling, dilemma solving. learning, creativity, and so on (Franklin, S., 1995). 
(\Btural cognition sclencelS 
philosophy 
lingulsUcs 
neurosciences 
artincialinlelilgenc:e 
~4iQ2 " ~Q(J.?&7t.l~~~CQ-""" 
Figure 2.3 Source: Encyclopedia Universalis, 2001 
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Davis (Davis, D. N., 2002) proposed an architecture for a cognitive agent by focusing on 
"control state, emotion, motivation and autonomy". His view is that an autonomous agent 
architecture should support drives and motivation. We have to mention in this stage that, 
there are no universal definitions for the terms: motivation, drive, goal and emotion. 
CogAff (Sloman, A., 2001) proposes two principal axes for the cognitive architecture: 
1. Cognitive cycles which includes: perception, central processing, and action. 
II. Structural part: 
Reactive mechanisms, which are (occasionally ballistic) behavioral
 
responses to environmental and intemal states;Deliberative reasoning,
 
which requires the explicit manipulation of sorne form of cognitive
 
structure (i.e. motivational constructs);
 
Meta-management mechanisms (reflective processes), which monitor the
 
agent's internai state, processes and ilS ongoing stimulus-response arcs.
 
This section illustrates Franklin's (Franklin, 5., 1995) ideas about design principles, 
which have been resulting from academic analysis of many autonomous agents. It provides 
an overall theory of cognitive agent design. 
2.6.1 Design principles for cogniti ve 
Drives: Primary motivators for agent actions and behaviors (Davis, D. N., 2002). Drives are 
low-level, ecological, physiological and typically pre-conscious. 
Attention: Agents have several senses; the attention mechanism helps filter unneeded inputs 
and focus on relevant input. 
Internai models: When required, the agent builds model from its environment. 
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Coordination: A multi-agent system is a distributed system ln that al! of its components 
communicate to carry out a special task. There is coordination between the various patts of 
the multi-agent system. 
Knowledge: The agent uses its senses to obtain enough information from itself and from its 
environment in order to execute its requirements. At the same time, acquired information 
might be learned (Drescher, G. L., 1988). It is evident that a better classification of 
knowledge and interrelations by the agent helps improve agent pelformance and learning. 
Consequently, the behavior of the agent (i.e. decision making, reasoning) could be closer to 
that of a human. 
Curiosity (Franklin, S,. 1997): "If an autonomous agent is to learn in an unsupervised way, 
some sort of more or less random behavior must be built in. Curiosity serves this function in 
humans, and apparently in mammals. Autonomous agents typically learn mostly by internal 
reinforcement. (The notion of the environment providing reinforcement is misguided.) 
Actions in a particular context whose results move the agent closer to satisfying some drive 
tend to be reinforced, that is made more likely to be chosen again in that context. Actions 
whose results move the agent further from satisfying a drive tend to be made less likely to be 
chosen again. In human and many animals, the mechanisms of this reinforcement include 
pleasure and pain. Every form of reinforcement learning must rely on some mechanism. 
Random activity is useful when not solution to the current contextual problem is known, and 
to allow the possibility of improving a known solution. (This principle doesn't apply to 
observational only forms of learning such as that employed in memory based reasoning 
(Maes, P,. 1989)". 
Routines: Most cognitive agents will need sorne means of transforming frequently used 
sequences of actions into something reactive so that they run faster. Cognitive scientists talk 
of becoming habituated. Computer scientists like the compiling metaphor. One example is 
Jackson's concept demons (Jackson, lV., 1987; Franklin, S., 1995). Agre's dissertation is 
concerned with human routines (in press). (Franklin, S., 1995). 
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2.6.2 High-Ievel Architectures for Cognitive Agents 
There is not a consensus among the architectures for cognitive agents proposed by 
many authors: as Albus (AI bus, J. S., 1991), Baars (Baars, B. 1.,1988), Ferguson (Ferguson, 
1. A., 1995), Hayes-Roth (Hayes-Roth, B., 1995), Jackson (Jackson, 1. V., 1987), Johnson 
and Scanlon (Johnson, M., Scan Ion, R., 1987), S\oman (Sloman, A., 1995). FrankJin 
(Franklin, S., 1995) offers an architecture (see figure 2.4) that puts emphasis on "action 
selection paradigm of mind". The perception mechanism acquires information and gives the 
premier meaning to the received information. In addition, the architecture is endowed with 
"long-term memory and short-term memory (workspace)". The attention task is of choosing 
and filtering more relevant and urgent contexts that are related to the drives. InternaI models 
(demonstrated) such as planners or schedulers that play a causal l'ole in agent architecture 
help the agent make deliberative actions (Franklin, S., 1995). Usual actions are represented 
by reactions and routines; however, solving a problem requires a deliberative mechanism. 
Learning and reactive behaviors are the result of knowJedge through which an agent can react 
faster or reinforce (by reasoning) the value of the actions that it has taken by reviewing its 
memory of past events. Leaming might be connected to everything in this architecture. The 
Jack of goals, emotions or attitudes that can influence the selection of actions in this 
architecture is evident. We wi Il cover these aspects in greater depth when presenting the 
LIDA architecture. 
r-_~learning f4---..-l deliberative rnechanisrns 
m.echanisn1.s	 interna.l rnodels 
plaïtning 
ploble-m solving 
scheduling 
language con-.posi tion 
1 actionsl 
action selection 
Figure 2.4 Cognitive agent architecture (Franklin, S., 2002). 
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In the next chapter we wjlJ see how consciousness can help an agent to learn. As a reaJ 
example of a cognitive agent, LillA uses consciousness mechanisms to learn. 
CHAPTER III 
BRIEF DISCUSSION ABOUT LIDA 
The IDA (Intelligent Distribution Agent) architecture is the product of the in progress 
study of the Conscious Software Research Group at the University of Memphis. Inspired by 
the theory of Baars, the team of Stan Franklin (University of Memphis) successively 
developed three intelligent agents that implemented this theory more and more. This work 
began in 1996 with the Virtual Mattie agent, which manages the booking and reminders for 
conferences in the Memphis University. This agent was replaced by Conscious Mattie, whose 
implementation is more faithful to the theory of Baars. Finally, Franklin's research group 
developed the IDA agent for the American navy and continues to improve it. IDA eventually 
evolved into LIDA, the Learning IDA. 
"LlDA, the learning IDA will add three modes of learning to IDA's design: perceptual 
learning, episodic learning, and procedurallearning. The LIDA architecture incorporates six 
major artificial intelligence software technologies: the copycat architecture, sparse 
distributed memory, pandemonium theory, the schema mechanism, the behavior net model, 
and the sub-sumption architecture." (Franklin, S., 2006). 
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3. LIDA: IDA endowed with learning mechanisms 
The IDA task is the assignment of new billets to the sailors. In the American Navy, at 
the end of each sailor's tour of duty, he or she is assigned to a new billet (task) by a detailer. 
IDA performs the detailer's role. She communicates with sailors via E-mail and she has to 
understand sailor requirements and preferences, and respect ail constraints (while respecting 
the Navy's regulations, the sailor must be satisfied by his assignment). To answer to the 
sailors, she has to communicate with different databases (Franklin, S., 2005). The 
architecture proposed by FrankJin describes a multi-agent system. He called it a "conscious 
agent" since the fundamental elements and processes rely on consciousness as described by 
Baars'. Mainly, the agent is constructed with simple agents called "codelets" (which 
reproduce Baars' "simple processors"). The central point of the system is the "access 
consciousness", which allows ail resources access to "broadcasts" of centrally selected 
information (which guide the agent ta be stimulated only with the most relevant information). 
LIDA's (Learning Intelligent Distribution Agent) architecture, as IDA's, is hybrid: 
parti y symbolic and partly connectianist (according to Brooks, R. A. 1986; 1990). Human 
cognition facets such as perception, episodic memories, are implemented functionally, that is, 
with no constraint on biological validity. LIDA operates and interacts with its envi~anment in 
ways inspired by human cognitive theories. Also, LIDA model allows for domain­
independent perceptual and procedural learning mechanisms. This agent permits automatic 
learning and can repair its mistakes. 
LIDA's architecture relies mastly on a "non rules-based" method. Here are the 
elements that compose il. 
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Workspace: The mechanism of the Workspace in LIDA corresponds to the human 
preconscious buffers of working memory (Figure 3.1). It is "the manipulable scratchpad of 
the mind (Miyake, A., and Shah, P., 1999)", with decay rates of tens of seconds. Information 
comes to them from perceptual or other internai parts of the agent that write into the 
workspace. They are the "place" that hold active codelets, which come from perception, 
including previous percepts not yet decayed away, recalls from long-term memories, and 
structures being assembled by structure-building codelets. Another l'ole of workspace is 
creation of links between new codelets (symboJs) thal arrive into memory and the codelets 
that already exist in the workspace (and not decayed away). 
Human Memory

Systems
 
Figure 3.1 Human Memory Systems (Franklin, S., et al., 2003) 
Episodic memories: Memories (Figure 3.1) for events (their time, their location and what 
exactly occurred). LIDA has both a transient episodic memory, and a Jong-term, 
"autobiographical" episodic memory. 
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Perceptual Associative Memory: ln humans, primitive feature detectors for vision are 
neurons located in the primary visual cortex to detect tines, etc., but for categorization and 
object detection, we need sorne association between primitive features detectors. ln LillA, it 
takes the form of a network of codelets. Perceptual codelets write to the Perceptual 
Associative memory in the form of stimulations. The codelets, then react and collaborate with 
each other to categorize the stimulus. The final pattern, a sub-network of codelets, then 
appears in the Workspace (D'Mello, S. K., et al., 2006). 
Functional Consciousness: ln LlDA, a "consciousness" module implements the Global 
Workspace (GW) theOJ-y (Baars, B. J., 1988) in a functional way. It states that there are a lot 
of independent processes being in parai lei processing, interacting through "consciousness" to 
accomplish a not automatized task. The functional implementation of "consciousness" 
consists of a coalition manager, a spotlight controller (corresponding to the attention), a 
broadcast manager, and attention codelets that recognize a new situation, or one that is 
interest for sorne reason, and interact with other codelets ta make a common front and 
process a situation. What gets selected by the spotlight control 1er is broadcast by the 
"consciousness" to the whole system. This broadcasting is the responsibility of consciousness 
(D'Mello, S. K., et al., 2006). 
Procedural Memory: Procedural memory ID LlDA is similar to Drescher's schema 
mechanism (Drescher, G. L., 1991). It is a graph that is constructed with nodes and links 
between them. Each node contains an action scheme. A scheme consists of an action, a 
context for it, and results that are a consequence of the execution of the scheme. Schemes can 
be found in the Scheme Network; they also come to exist in the Behavior Network, in their 
"active form", after their instantiation from the Scheme Net. They may be complex or simple; 
a simple scheme has just one action. Complex schemes contain multiple actions. Schemes 
need to be selected by the action selection mechanism to set off (to "fire") (D'Mello, S. K., et 
al., 2006). LillA uses Maes' Action Selection Mechanism (Maes, P., 1989), as modified by 
Negatu and Franklin (Negatu, A., and Franklin,S., 2002) to effect action selection in the 
service of feelings and emotions. Feeling and emotions are parallel, independent processes 
usually stimulated by the occurrence of events in the environment. Sometimes their urgency 
changes by the simple passage of time. Activation supplied by them spreads through the 
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nodes in this direct graph. In addition, activation \s conung from activation that already 
exists. received from predecessor actions in the Scheme Net. and from internai or external 
(environment) States. 
3.1 Cognitive Cycle in LIDA: 
LIDA's cognitive cycle (Figure 3.2) is the result of several distributed mechanisms 
inspired from human cognition aspects. Functional interactions are grouped in LIDA under 
nine sequential steps involving different parts of the agent to accomplish the processing of a 
perception and taking action. Cycles repeat endlessly and may be considered as beginning 
with a perception and ending in actions, but may be looked upon the reverse way. Baars and 
Franklin (Baars. B. J., and Franklin, S., 2003) suggested that cognitive cycles occurs five to 
ten times a second; however sorne processes occur in parai lei and may result in much more 
cycles per second. 
Action Selectec\ 
and 'T'aJœn 
(beMVlCr codelets) 
~ Red tndicates leelmg;i or emo1lllns are lI\\tllml 
ExpectltionaJ ~=:j:::;i~;;j~i.1~~i!i~~,j~~2jL_..:... -=:::i:;;;:====~===~lnlentionCodeletsL 
Figure 3.2 LIDA's cognitive cycle (Franklin,S., 2006) 
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Here are these nine steps which give a brief description about them from 
Franklin and his colleagues' papers. 
I-Perception: 
"The process ofassigning meaning to incoming sensory data. Examples: The 
color red, a sound" (Franklin, S., 2006). 
2) Percept to preconscious buffer. 
Ail interpreted data and meaning is stored in preconscious buffers of LIDA's 
Working Memory, adding to the information aJready there and that has not yet decayed 
away. 
3) Local associations. 
Preconscious buffers serve as cues for memory retrieval. Information associated 
with the cues are retrieved automatically from transient episodic memory and 
declarative memory, and stored back in Long-term Working Memory. Local 
associations comprise information about past actions, and feeling and emotion of the 
agent about these actions and events. 
4) Competition for consciousness. 
Here, attention codelets (AC) observe Long-term working memory content. AC, 
try to distinguish important events or urgent situations, to form coalitions describing 
them and bring them to consciousness. This competition is intluenced by present and 
past feelings and emotions. Coalitions show more strength when agent affects about 
particular information are strong. 
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5) Conscious broadcast 
The attention codelet with its related information that has been selected for its 
importance cornes to consciousness. In humans, conscious broadcasts are hypothesized 
to correspond to phenomenal consciousness. Conscious broadcasts hold of ail current 
information of consciousness and emotional part. Perceptual, episodic and procedural 
memories will update their information's after conscious broadcast. After each update, 
agent has leamed and can use updated information in the next cognitive cycles. 
6) Recruitment of resources. 
The most relevant scheme answers to the broadcasted information by the action 
of its underlying codelets. Feelings and emotions help to find appropriate response for 
the broadcasted information. 
7) Setting goal context hierarchy. 
This answer results in the instantiation of a new goal context. Codelets request 
the instantiation of their conesponding node (scheme), and of the stream that contains 
it, including the goal. Then they bind their variables to the received information and 
augment their node's activation in the Behavior Network. 
8) Action chosen. 
The Behavior Network manager selects a scheme from CUiTent or previously 
instantiated behavior streams according to the presence of preconditions and on the 
most activated scheme. Selection of behaviors also depends on the feelings or emotions 
that gave activation to the codelets that underlie the nodes of BN. 
9) Action taken. 
Each selected scheme spawns at least one expectation codelet to monitor the 
results of the act. The execution of a behavior produces outcomes (internai or external). 
Expectation code/ets observe what cornes into Workspace as the result of the execution 
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of action. They try to bring to consciousness what they find to consciousness for update 
or creation of new codelets in different part of the system (perception, episodic or 
procedural mechanism). 
3.2 Perceptual Learning in LillA: 
One of the human learning mechanisms is perceptual learning (PL). "Perceptual associative 
memory (PAM) is implemented in LlDA (D'Mello,S et al., 2006) architecture as a slipnet, a 
semantic net with passing activation (Hofstadter, D. R., and Mitchell,M., 1994). Perceptual 
learning in the LlDA model occurs with consciousness. This learning is of two forms, the 
strengthening or weakening of the 'base-level activation of existing nodes, as well as the 
creation ofnew nodes and links (D'Mello,S et al., 2006). 
Any concept that appears in a broadcast reinforces the base-level activation of the 
corresponding node and could reinforce its links with others in the "Slipnet"; this gives the 
node more chances to be chosen by the perceptual mechanism for future coalition. When a 
new object is detected by perceptual detectors, a "new-item" attention codeJet notices this 
new object and tries to find corrunon features such as spatial adjacency, corrunon activity, and 
perseverance over time. If a "similarity" attention codelet can detect in LWM two or three 
items with several common features and can bring them as a coalition into "consciousness" 
for broadcasting, then a new category (node) will be created by the perceptual Jearning 
mechanism. After that, the PLM tries to find appropriate nodes to Iink it with. The 
mechanism for Slipnet here may look like that for an ontology. In fact, LillA categorizes its 
concepts similar to the ontology mechanism to (Franklin, S., and Patterson, F. G. Ir., 2006). 
New relations will be learned when they are broadcast by consciousness; in LillA, this job is 
done by "relation-noting-attention-codelets". 
3.3 Episodic Learning in LillA: 
Episodic learning in human beings is the learning of the events. For example, we remember 
what we ate for lunch today. The first task in episodic learning is interpretation of conscious 
content such as What, When, Where of occurrence of each episodes into Episodic Memory. 
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3.4 
Each time the agent finds an episode in the content of LIDA's consciousness, it tries to 
connect the source of activation of the cUITent episode in the Slipnet to the basic features 
sensing elements. Each basic feature sensor in the Slipnet corresponds to a word, and each 
word has a preset place in a special buffer of the Workspace. Events happened in 
consciousness will be ciphered in Sparse Distributed Memory SDM in LIDA (D'Mello, S. K., 
et al., 2006). 
Procedural Leaming in LIDA: 
The authors used a combination of instructionalist and selectionist mechanisms for 
procedural leaming in the Scheme Net5. An empty scheme consists of an action without 
conte,'([ ,or result. Procedural learning happens as action reinforcement as weil as the creation 
of new schemes. There are two kinds of activation in nodes: base-level and current-level. 
Base-level activation indicates the odds of its result happening if the action is taken in the 
proper context. Current-level, measures the pertinence of the scheme to the current situation. 
Learning (into base-level activation) goes according to a sigmoid function (a "S"-shaped 
curve). Initial reinforcement tends to accelerate then saturate. Here is how this learning 
works. 
Each time LIDA executes an action, it first instantiates from the Scheme Net its empty 
scheme (the description of the action, devoid of context and expected result). The context 
(preconditions) then applied to this empty scheme is the conscious content just received 
before the action execution. At the same time, the scheme automatically produces an 
expectation codelet before action execution. After action execution, the expectation codelet 
tries to bring to Consciousness the results of the action. If it can, then the results are applied 
to the new pending node (scheme). The Scheme Net inserts the new node if it does not 
5 "The scheme net is a directed graph whose nodes are (action) schemes and whose links represent the 
'derived from' relation. Built-in primitive (empty) schemes directly controlling effectors are analogolls 
to motor ceil assemblies controiling muscle groups in humans. A scheme consists of an action, 
together with ifs context and ifs result. At the periphery of the scheme net lie empty schemes (schemes 
with a simple action, but no context or resuits), while more complex schemes consisting ofactions and 
action sequences are discovered as one moves inwards".(D'Mello, S. K., et al., 2006). 
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3.5 
already exist (the same action with the same preconditions and the same results; this is 
instruciionalist leaming). If it already exists, then the system reinforces the base-Ievel 
acti vation of the existing node (selectionist learning).(D'Mello, S. K., et al., 2006). 
Current problems or shortcomings in LIDA: 
1.	 When a goal is selected by the action selection mechanism, it may be routinely 
executed in various ways. How LIDA does make decision to execute a selected 
task in way 1 and not in way2 or way3? To our knowledge, Franklin did not 
address this problem in his works. One of the current challenges (lack) in this 
architecture is how to select among multiple ways to realize the selected goal. 
2.	 It is not clear how LillA learn new schema? 
3.	 As we mentioned above, the information stored in Transient Episodic Memory 
(TEM) represents contextual information: the nodes from PAM including sorne 
indication of physical space, plus an indication of the time of the event. This is 
because LIDA's TEM currently is exclusively a perceptual episodic memory. 
At this point, LIDA's research group is not sure how to encode the time of 
events which happened in consciousness (when anevent happen) ITÙght be 
encoded. 
4.	 Franklin has not yet addressed the causality of events. We believe that for each 
event, there is a cause. Then it would be a good thing to add a causal memory 
which has relations with autobiographical memory. Our proposition (Figure 
3.3) is that within each coalition, it is mandatory to join a causal reason that 
will be used for retrieving the proper information (cognitive cycle's step 3) and 
learning each event. 
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cd: Memory) 
Autobiol;J"aphical Mernory Causal Mernory 
Figure 3.3 Associations between Autobiographical and Causal Memories 
5.	 LIDA is not yet endowed with Meta-cognitive abilities. In fact, earlier attempts 
at adding meta-cognition to similar software agents (Zhang,Z., et al., 1998; 
Zhang and Franklin, unpublished) was not successful. LIDA's architecture 
must allow to the attention codelets and "behavior streams" to recognize and 
process the need of meta-cognitive interventions. 
6.	 LIDA currently has not addressed ascending and unconscious learning of 
explicit knowledge. 
LIDA, in its procedural learning (D'Mello, S. K., et al., 2006), proposes that the 
result of each action must be brought back to consciousness, whereas experiments 
relating to implicit Ieal'ning demonstrate that satisfied expectations usually do not 
provide feedback to the subject (Baars, BJ., 1997; Cleeremans, A., and Jiménez, L., 
1996; C1eeremans, A., et al., 1998; Curran, T., and Keele, S.W., 1993). 
CHAPTER IV 
OUR SOLUTION: lNTEGRATlNG LEARNlNG CAPABILITIES IN crs 
4. Introduction 
crs conceptual architecture is implemented as modules which communicate by messages 
(codelets) exchanged through Working Memory and by getting ail important, urgent 
conversation into consciousness which inspired from the theory of Baars (Baars, B. J., 
Franklin, S., 2003). CTS base elements and mechanisms such as codelets, consciousness, 
episodic and procedural networks, long-term memories, are quite similar to LIDA structural 
design. However, there are differences in learning mechanisms, among other things. For 
example, unconscious perceptual and procedural learning were not implemented as separate 
mechanisms in LIDA. In fact, the existence of such a learning method in human beings is 
supposed in both CLARION, developed by Sun (in Sun, R., 2004) and ACT-R, developed by 
Anderson (Anderson, 1. R., et al., 2003). These systems are endowed with separa te implicit 
and explicit Jearning mechanisms. However, our learning models differ from CLARION's 
and ACT-R's in that we used Baars' Global Workspace theory (a neuro-psychoJogical theory) 
as their bases, along with psychological experimentations that are our other resources to take 
CTS unconscious learning mechanisms closer to human learning methods. Although CTS 
does not currently implement the whole functionality of cognition, its conceptual architecture 
covers a wide base Uust as does LIDA's) and allows for further additions. It also supports 
some functional associations to the physiology of the brain. 
4.1 Brief introduction to CTS cognitive cycle 
As our agent is a cognitive agent, then we start this section by describing crs 
cognitive cycle. The base process mechanism of the CTS system is the "codelet". Modules 
communicate with one another and they contribute information to Working Memory (WM) 
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by information codelets. These travel back and forth through cycles of "conscious 
publications" that broadcast the most important, urgent, or relevant information. CTS 
cognitive cycle incorporates the traditional Perception-Reasoning-Action phases, but with 
more details (quite close to LIDA's). 
CTS cognitive cycle (Figure 4.1) starts with the perception phase, with messages 
describing the state of the micro-world entering into CTS through its sensory buffer. This 
partly structured information is examined by several perception codelets that try to recognize 
something in the stimulus. When a perception-codelet does recognize something, it stimulates 
its corresponding node (codelet) in the Perception Network. The result of this collective 
interpretation work creates a percept that enters Working Memory (WM) as a network of 
codelets. At this point, codelets arriving into WM make or reinforce associations with other 
code1ets a1ready present. In the reasoning phase, attention code lets observe WM to find 
specific information and try to bring it into consciousness, competing with other coalitions 
that formed "naturally" (without the intervention of attention codelets) in WM. The Attention 
mechanism spots the most energetic coalition in WM and submits it to the access 
consciousness, which broadcasts it ta the whole system. With this broadcast, any subsystem 
or codelets in different parts of the system that recognizes the information, may react. This 
may create reflection loaps that pursue further a line af reasoning through consecutive 
participations of various sub-systems in cycles of selection-broadcast-reaction. Finally, the 
system, by its Behavior Network (BN), selects an appropriate action for execution. 
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4.2 
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Figure 4.1 Cognitive cycle in CTS 
Adding Strengths between Codelets 
The first change that we made into CTS' architecture (which is useful for learning), was 
giving "Strength" to each link between two Codelets. Two codelets, will join to the WM 
when they have enough energy-and make connections with others, which mad links in WM 
c;ould be used for Jearn regularities, creating elements that CTS will be able to use in later 
reasoning. During interaction between information codelets in Working Memory links 
strength values can be increased or decreased bya Hebbian learning (Hebb, D. O., 1949; a 
rheOl'y incorporated in Jackson's Pandemonium theory). According to the times codelets 
spend with others in WM, links between them reinforce, and then weaken while they are not 
together inside WM. In Figure 4.2, we can see the link between Codelet-info-Collision (by 
"in/a" we mean information-codelet) and two others (Joint-WE and Distance) and the 
strengths between them. 
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4.3 
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~ ~/ Strenght=. 
Codelet-Info-Distance 
Figure 4.2 Strengths between Codelets 
Access Consciousness 
As we mentioned in Chapter one, for any movement in space, astronauts must first select a 
proper set of cameras and obtain the best possible views by adjusting them. Then only he is 
allowed to start moving the Arm. We will explain it by the following example. In the essay 
task, we suppose that the astronaut fOl-got to adjust its views and started to move the 
Canadarm. The Domain Expert module in CTS detects the problematic situation and sends a 
coalition describing that fact (it believes about a "Missing step: Adjusting views"). If this 
information gets published by the access consciousness, various modules may respond with 
codelets describing a probable cause, which are attached to the original coalition. Each 
proposition for a cause may consist of two or more parts consisting of separate codelets. In 
our example, one of them can arri ve from the Learner Profi le module proposing "Distraction" 
with a computed probability of 40%; a second one may be coming from the "Learner 
Knowledge Model" module, proposing "Poor knowledge of procedures" with a computed 
60% probability. The copy of the original coalition that came back into Working Memory 
with the stronger cause will receive a code let stating "Cause: Approved" from the 
Deliberation Arbiter. With this information, the system can make an optimal decision for any 
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4.4 
intervention, based on its available informationsources. This strategy leads us to think about 
causallearning which 1 will describe with related details, later on in this chapter. 
Procedural network (PN) 
By Procedural network we mean planning, making decision and execution of selected 
actions. Ali mentioned parts must be mediated consciously (FrankJin, S., 2006), but in CTS 
just actions execute consciously. The 
behaviour streams controlled and 
ordered under drives and sub-goals. 
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mandatory preconditions that will 
BN 
causes different sequences on the 
system. Received energies by "des ire" or "feeling" will be spread along the system in a top­
down model. However, "behaviours" may return their energies (if their preconditions change) 
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towards other behaviours. Naturally, received energy will be spread towards next nodes, if 
one of the preconditions becomes true. Different scenario may be considered for a special 
problem. The figure 4.3 is very simple but each behaviour may have sorne preconditions 
toward others nodes and if we starting from Collision node, up to Collision Detection & 
Remedy Finished node, the system may pass different path to accomplish selected task (for 
more information we refer you to the Dubois's doctoral thesis). 
4.5 Adding Strengths into Procedural Network 
In the procedural network, the states Iisten to the publication coming from conciseness. When 
astate hears a publication, which contains the information that it concern about them, it 
reacts to the received information by changing its state to true. However, states are the 
preconditions of actions, "desires", "feeling" or "behaviours". The relations (Figure 4.4) 
between different nodes in the behaviour streams had not strength before, but we 
distinguished that this might be one of the mandatory properties for procedural learning in 
CTS. By giving strength to the links each time the agent select an act, their link value will 
change (add or lose a celtain value of energies) and next time, this task will execute faster or 
slower (than before) according to the gatheredllost energy from previous execution. 
Find a remedy 
identllied 
o~ems 1Javadoc , Dedarabon :J Properbes i:Z 
'roper ty value 
Procedural Link StrengU, 0.2 
Figure 4.4 Strength between state and other nodes in PN 
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4.6 CTS Learning facets 
As we mentioned earlier, crs architecture inspired from LlDA' s structural design. Since our 
implementation differs fairly from LIDA's structural design, we propose some additional 
ways of learning. In this part we explain some impJemented and forthcoming (which we aim 
to implement them in the future and are out of the capacity of a master thesis) learning 
aspects in CTS. Contrary to LIDA's domain of application, ail inputs to the perceptual 
mechanism in our agent are predefined in the ISS as joints, collisions, etc. LIDA uses natural 
language e-mails to communicate with people and needs "Slipnet" to understand and giving 
meaning to the content of received E-mail in the Franklin(Franklin, S., et al., 2006) mode\. 
CTS', does not need to discover a new world, except maybe if we later grant it with stronger 
conversationaJ abilities. However, our firsl strategy for learning is different from LIDA 
learning could happens before (at perception level that we will explain it later on) and after 
conscious broadcasl. We will discuss about Input-output learning and causallearning too. 
L.	 The first difference between our system and LIDA is that, in LIDA, attention codelets 
decide ta form coalition, whereas in our system the codelets create coalition by own 
decision and do not need attention codelets to form coalitions. For example, in our 
system a coalition could be a single codelet on its own, as a concrete example when user 
is inactive; an attention codelet (coalition) will be published to inform the system about 
inactivity in the system. 
2.	 Learning of Environmental Regularities: LlDA accomplishes conceptual and semantic 
learning in its perceptual associative memory (PAM, called a slipnet). New concepts 
found in a conscious broadcast are added in the PAM with its new links. In CTS, codeJets 
that appear within the same time-frame in Working Memory (WM) create links or 
reinforces their links with others. If this conjunction of codelets happens frequently, it 
has a high probability of corresponding to a concept and should reach a coalition status to 
represent il. If the repetition happens saon enough, it causes a reinforcement of links 
between codelets until the strength is sufficient to justify the status of coalition. Then, it 
may be selected for broadcasting, which allows the concept to be memorized in long­
term declarative memory and in the perceptual network. We still have to design this Jast 
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step of adding concepts in the perceptual network with semantic links. Although 
conceptual learning may happen consciously, as in LillA, we currently aim only at a 
phenomenon that happens before consciousness. 1 will give a more detailed description 
about learning of Regularities in this section later on. 
3.	 Causal leaming (underway): in this part, crs is not limited to just input-output 
information. It tries to find cause and reason of each event and start to reconstrucl its 
knowledge by them. We have not just simple va in crs, agent is capable to think, and 
decide to form a coalition. 
4.	 Meta cognition learning (underway): Another learning facet of the BN in crs is the 
fusion of certain acts. A sort of learning that affects directly, both the planning and the 
action execution in BN. When a behaviour executes for many times, it is possible to 
create a shortcut to achieve the anticipated goal. crs will create a new parallel pathway, 
eventually short-circuiting the old one. A new pathway that got created in a first 
execution has not enough energy for saturation, but it presents a shorter route, which is 
an advantage in the planning phase; if the context presents itself again many times, it will 
eventually saturate completely the new pathways and the old way, not used anymore, will 
decay away (be forgotten). 
5.	 Procedural Learning exists In crs: It presents an automatization capability that 
accelerates planning and behaviour sequences execution. rhis happens when energy 
passes through the links between acts. Contrary to LIDA, in crs each action may refer 
to a decision taken by crs learner model or domain model or a compromise between 
them. Then it is very important to restore this kind of information in which helps CTS, to 
remember (and then learn) by finding the reference of each action executed in BN. 
This report presents: 
Learning of Environmental Regularities, Procedural leaming through reinforcement 
and Procedural learning through automatization. 
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4.7	 Learning of Environmental Regularities 
C1eeremans in (Cleeremans, A., et al., 1996, 1998, and 2002) showed by sorne 
experiments that to perceive something consciously, it must be represented by a good qua lity 
structure that is self-sustainabJe for a period of time. Otherwise, it will stay unconscious. 
"Perception is unconscious when it is under the subjective threshold"( Cheesman et al 
,1984). Dienes et al. (Dienes, Z., et al, 1997) adds to this idea that unconscious learning 
may happen when knowledge stays below the "subjective threshold" (we added the 
emphasis). So, even below consciousness levels, percepts may yet cause implicit learning, 
and this is the phenomenon we are aiming at here. ln this learning, consciousness is not 
involved. 
We reproduce this phenomenon of implicit learning of regularities by the 
reinforcement of the association links between codelets present in WM during the same time 
frame. This is inspired by the Pandemonium theory, which was developed as a bottom-up 
theory for categorizing; complementing this theory is the hebbian learning theory (Hebb, D. 
0,1949), appropriate for learning perceptual stimuli. 
Pandemonium theories (Selfridge, O. G., 1959), was developed as a bottom-up theory for 
learning and categorizes perceptual stimuli. It consists of four layers, each layer composed of 
special information or demons (a function or an active micro-process) for a special task. In 
our agent, this learning based on the Pandemonium theory, as extended by Jackson (Jackson, 
J. V., 1987). 
•	 The bottom layer consists of data and images information ("demons") cornes from 
petceptual mechanism to store and categorize concepts. Another rule in this layer is 
interpretation ("Perceptual Associative Memory"). 
•	 The third layer composed of computational demons, which carry out complex 
computations or estimations on the data and pass results to the upper layer. 
•	 The second layer composed of cognitive information demons that try to estimate the 
weight of data come's From third layer and try to represent appropriate information 
(demons) as candidate to the first layer. 
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•	 In the first layer, decision demons sees, which demons in second layer is more 
appropriate for CUiTent problem and could be broadcasted into the network. 
According to Pandemonium theory, there exists population of demons on the arena. 
Arena is divided into "stands" and "plaing field ". Moreover, each demons (we cali it codelet) 
is a simple agent. Sorne active codelets on the playing field doing whatever they designed (or 
created) for, and the rest of the codelets situated in the stands are watching and waiting for 
something to happen in which it could excite them. After receiving enough energy for 
excitement, they try shouting according to the degree of stimulus that they received, if 
daemon shouts frantically enough then they can become active. When a codelet transferred 
from stands to the playing field, it starts to make relation with others. Each Iink has a precise 
weight, in a similar fashion as in a neural network. 
In our implementation, learning in WM is essentially related to the reinforcement of the links 
between code lets according to the time that they spend together in WM. This kind of learning 
is called connectionist. When a link's strength between two codelets crosses a specified 
threshold, these codelets learn the association as a coalition state, thereon, this new known 
coalition becomes available for publication by the access consciousness and can be exposed 
to assimilation by Working Memory. Consequently, during a cognitive cycle in CTS, virtual 
world information is captured by cameras then entered into WM where it will be examined 
by Perceptual Learning Mechanism (Faghihi ,0., et al., 2007) (Figure 4.1).The PLM will 
distinguish which codelets (recei ved information will converted to the codelets by the 
perceptual mechanism) has made connections with others and figures out a meaning (for 
example "collision" status between two joints in the virtual world) (Dubois, D., 2007). This 
information (codelets) with their new calculated strengths (links with others codelets in WM) 
will be saved as current-active-information (information-codelets), and then information­
codelets who made a meaning and selected as coalition to be send to the consciousness 
mechanism will be examined after conscious broadcasting, to decide which of them answered 
by different part of the system (to produce an action) and might be learned. Thus, in CTS 
conscious learning happen after information's broadcasted by consciousness and unconscious 
learning (Cheesman, 1., and Merikle, P. M., 1984) happen in perception phase. Both learning 
happen in parallel, in fact when agent doing something important at the same time perceptual 
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mechanism receives information from virtual world and learn. Reinforcement follows a 
sigmoid function. Initial reinforcement happens slowly, with a subsequent rapid growth as 
more time of common activity is spent in WM, slowing down when the strength approaches a 
saturation level, until it becornes virtually permanent. Links with activation that have reached 
the specified maximum will weaken very slowly. Leaming without any chance of forgetting 
would make this adaptive means a plague, maintaining any and every new Iink ever created. 
In a flesh and blood brain, energy is at premium; a connection consumes energy and must 
earn its keep. It must prove its usefulness. A single occurrence of a relation should not be 
kept unless it was created by a strong, traumatic (or highly pleasurable) event that caused a 
highly systemic state. In other words, the brain must be allowed to forget incidental links 
between neurons. Accordingly, at the end of each cognitive cycle, crs computes the 
"memory loss". It scans WM to see if any link it knows of (that exists in its storage table) is 
used in WM (that is, the codelets using this link are present in WM). Those that are not 
present in WM have to incur sorne association loss due to the passage of time. In fact, if 
codelets that have links together are not called back together into WM soon enough, they will 
have their links weaken and eventually be forgotten by this natural phenomenon of 
attenuation. "Memory loss", our mechanism for forgetting, uses the same kind of sigmoid 
function involved in learning, but reversed and "softened" (showing a softer slope). 
Indeed, we observe in real life that a concept or a procedure we learned in a few 
minutes can be remembered quite well for many days. For exampJe, when learning a kata in 
Karate, most of the movement is remembered weil enough after one or two exercises until the 
next training day. Here is the equation that we use for computing links' strength. 
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4.8 Implementation phase: 
Technical implementation of mentioned descriptions in CTS appears first, when the 
programme executes, as a "consciousness viewer" (Figure 4.5), which consists of three panes: 
•	 Last Message: 
o	 Perceptual information received from the simu)ator; 
•	 Current Scene: 
o	 Working Memory (or scene, in Baars' metaphor) to which ail data interpreted 
from the simulator and from other sources will be written temporarily. 
•	 Broadcasted: 
o	 Ail relevant information (codelets) brought into Consciousness and 
broadcasted to ail entities in the system; 
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Figure 4.5 CTS Consciousness Viewer 
Figure 4.6, shows UML c1ass diagrams (collaboration between different parts) of the system 
for leaming propose. 
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UML diagram (Figure 4.7) illustrates corresponding steps for learning: 
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Figure 4.7, Links Reinforcement and Making New Relation between Codelets 
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Implementation phase: 
The first important task definitely given to the Learning Mechanism (LM) here is loading up 
ail data (information-codelets with their links information) previously saved (/earned) by 
system from storage memory (Figure 4.5), which CTS stored in previous executions. 
private static LearningParametersSaving instance = null; 
public static LearningParametersSaving getlnstance() 
if (instance == null) { 
inscance = new LearningParametersSaving(); 
instance.openFile("C:\\Learning") ; 
} 
return instance; 
Each codelet may have a list of links (Figure 4.8) which each links contain a strength value, 
with other codelets that previously saved (such as Joint SY withjoint S2 in the virtual world). 
These links values (strength) might be changed by calling codelets into WM, and passing a 
portion of time with others. 
public class LearningAssociation 
private String codeletl; 
private String codelet2; 
private double strength; 
Ali previously saved codelets with their associations will be loaded by the next procedure 
(getLearningAssociationsSet()) : 
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Public Set<LearningAssociation> getLearningAssociationsSet() { 
i / list of associatioM; will be find by this procedu.r·e 
Collection<List<LearningAssociation» listes; 
il synchronized (mapAssociation) {
 
listes = mapAssociation.values();
 
Set<LearningAssociation> set new
 
HashSet<LearningAssociation>() ;
 
for (List<LearningAssociation> liste listes) ( 
set.addAll(liste) ; 
return set; 
This procedure loads up ail codelets and their connections into a temporary buffer. For each 
cognitive cycle, we have to capture ail current-active-information-codelets purposely 
launched by the software and the new ones coming up to WM. In doing so, in paraI leI there 
exist some observer-codelets which are aware of the system current situation; they observe 
and detect new events happening in the system (actOutsideScene()) and add into their list ail 
new information-codelets (and their links information with others ) enter WM. 
protected void actOutsideScene() { 
Set<Codelet> allActiveCodelet =Theater.getInstance() .getScene()
 
.getCodelets(); }
 
New information-codelets which passes a portion of times and make connections with others 
in WM might be added to the temporary buffer. Next step is the creation of new links 
between new entered codelets with others (codelets) active in WM (Scene). Accordingly, if 
entered codelet from perceptual mechanism that made a concept has no association with 
others (it is new) in LM, then LM will notes ail information about this new codelets with its 
links and other necessary information in "allActiveCodelet" list. 
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If codelet already exist in the current-active-codelet-/ist of LM, its information will be just 
updated which consist of the reinforcement of the links between this codelet and others 
(Figure 4.8). 
COsln Itive cycl e=4
 
Lm k Stren gth =0C'O()~ 32
 
Cogn Itlve cycle=5 
LI nk Stren 9th =000203 
Figure 4.8 Links Strength between two codelets for two different cognitive cycles 
In this stage, for each link, system has to find the last cognitive cycles in which codelet 
appeared and passed the time with others in WM and the last value (strength) of each links. 
Thus, new strength value (for each direct link between codelets) with its learning rate (here 
the learning rate is equal 0.1) and new cognitive cycles for each link will be computed in the 
sigmoid function. Ali these steps happend in realtime in CTS. 
int size = oldAssociation. getTimes () . size () ;
 
long dernierTemps = oldAssociation. getTimes () . get (size - 1);
 
int strengthSize=oldAssociation.getStrengths() .size() i 
oldAssociation.increaseStrength(strengthValue) i 
The saving process to ("aIlActiveCodelet") list happens at the end of each cognitive cycle. ln 
fact, ail new codeletes broadcasted through the system will be added automatically to the 
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"allActiveCodelet" list6 as learned injormation-codelets. At the end of the execution of 
software, when system receives shutdown command, then ail information will be saved 
definitively. The reason for which we did not update entering codelets into WM, 
("aIIActiveCodelet") list. directly into the final file ("C:\\Learning"), is that there are a lot of 
threads launched at the same time by the software (cognitive cycles happens five times per 
second in CTS), then online updating with ("C:\\Learning") will cause data interfering during 
data input/outputs and slow down software performance. The best way that we found was 
opening a temporary file which calls back alilearned codelets with their links into memory, 
then updating this fi le with ("allActiveCodelet"), and finaJly, at the end of software 
execution, sa ving ail information (concepts) by one step. Learning function folJows a sigmoid 
function: 
public static double sigmoidFunction(double cognitiveCycle) ( 
double strength=l/ (l+Math. pow( 2.17, (rate* (cogni tiveCycle) * 
(System.currentTimeMillis())))) ; 
Final code for saving ail learned information: 
if(currentState !=null) ( 
LearningStateParameterSaving.getInstance() .saveToFile("C:\\Le
 
arning") ;
 
6 The information broadcasted, because they created links with other codelets in WM, and selected by 
attention mechanism then brought to the consciousness. This information will be learned at the end of 
each cognitive cycle. 
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Sigmoid function corresponding to our learning mechanism: 
1
 
Strength = (_. dl C
1+ e H+ .1. 
Where: 
-x: Association strength between two codelets 
-s: Rate of increase of base-Ievel activation (for the links between codelets) 
-d: Threshold value for conversion into a coalition 
-C: The number of cognitive cycles since the creation of the link 
-t: Time for two codelets passed together in WM. 
Figure 4.9 shows the effect of the learning mechanism on the reinforcement of the links 
between codelets in WM, as realized with a sigmoid function. This is an example to show 
that learning starts reinforcing the links by small amounts. By the passage of time (with 
further meeting in WM), links strength tend to saturate sigmoid function very fast and then 
learning function will be completed. As we can see, the second half of the learning behavior 
in this figure follows the same behavior as the first part but inversely (saturation). By 
saturating sigmoid function learning rate increases very slowly (when it approach to one), 
however it will never reach one. The opposite of sigmoid function creates the reinforcement 
curve which shows the decline curve (uses for forgetting aspects). Consequently, links with 
low strength value incline rapidly, while links with high (saturated) strength value incline 
with lower rate. 
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Learnig behavior in sigmoid funclion 
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Figure 4.9, Learning rate leading to a sigmoidal curve reinforcement 
of the link between two information codelets. 
4.9 Forgetting mechanism 
Learning without any chance of forgetting would make this CTS' learning mechanism 
a plague, maintaining any and every new link ever created_ In a f1esh and blood brain, energy 
is at premium; a connection consumes energy and must earn its keep. It must praye its 
usefulness. A single occurrence of a relation should not be kept unless it was created by a 
strong, traumatic (or highly pleasurable) event that caused a highly systemic state. In other 
words, the brain must be allowed to forget incidental links between neurons. Accordingly, at 
the end of each cognitive cycle, CTS computes the "memory loss". It scans WM to see if any 
link it knows of (that exists in its storage table) is used in WM (that is, the codelets using this 
link are present in WM). Those that are not present in WM have to incur sorne association 
loss due to the passage of time. In fact, if codelets that have links together are not called back 
together into WM soon enough, they will have their links weaken and eventually be forgotten 
by this natural phenomenon of attenuation. "Memory loss", our mechanism for forgetting, 
uses the same kind of sigmoid function involved in learning, but reversed and "softened" 
(showing a softer sJope) (Faghihi ,0., et al., 2007). From the implementation point of view, 
here is how it goes. In each cognitive cycle, we fetch ail stored active codelets (which 
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e1\ecuted in the previous cognitive cycles) and their relations with others from stored memory 
into a temporary buffer, and then we have to compare them with the current active codelets in 
WM. This, because cognitive cycles happen five times per seconds and each time there a lot 
of codelets enter WM(from perceptual mechanism) and system might compare new arrived 
codelets with previously saved(or executed by system) codelets. At the end of each cognitive 
cycle system might compare ail codeJets saved temporarily in the buffer and ail active 
codelets in WM. If codelets which situated in temporary buffer are already present in WM, 
then the learning method for reinforcement will be executed for them, as described in the 
previous section. If system does not find them in WM, then links (strength) between codelets 
start to lose their energies (mean value obtained experimentally, is subtraction of CUITent 
values by 0.01 which we calculate upon sigmoid function) that get weaken. Subsequently, If 
codelets do not get called back into WM at the end of each cognitive cycle, their links start to 
be forgotten by CTS forgetting mechanism, just as in human forgetting mechanism (Figure 
4.10) (Hebb, D. O.. 1949). 
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Figure 4.10 Forgetting Scenarios in CTS 
Forgetting implementation phase follows learning processes except, at the end of each 
cognitive cycle. Learning mechanism, try to find already learned codelets in the (temporary­
active-buffer which loaded temporarily ail learned data) memory and are not called back into 
Scene (software cannot find them in the allActiveCodelet list), then their links with other 
might lose energy. 
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boolean find=false;
 
Iterator iterCodelet = allActiveCodelet.iterator();
 
while(iterCodelet.hasNext() && find==falsel ( 
Codelet mine = (Codelet)iterCodelet.next(); 
if(fileAsso.equalsIgnoreCase(mine.getName())) {
 
find=true;
 
} 
ilif ('),',"'l,=t diô not find il he Wl1, d;o,creasp lts lin".s Il,nergies 
\.'1 l c, ~,r x: c',) l 
if(find == false) ( 
int 
sizePure=subtractionStrength.getStrengths() .size(); 
double
 
value=subtractionStrength.getStrengths() .get(sizePure-l);
 
subtractionStrength. secondDecreaseStrength (value) ; 
public void	 secondDecreaseStrength(double cognitiveCycle) (
 
double baseValue = Math.loglO((l - cognitiveCycle) 1
 
cognitiveCycle) ; 
double e = Math.loglO(2.17); 
double bdivtoe = (baseValue / (-2 * e)); 
double x = bdivtoe - 0.01; 
double secondStrength = 1 / (1 + Math.pow(2.17, ((x - 5)))); 
Here, updating processes and saving ail data' s after stopping software, follows learning 
methods. 
To illustrate learning and forgetting, Figure 4.11 and Table 4.1 show how link strength 
evolves between two codelets (Codelet-Info-Event-*, Codelet-Info-Event-Timestamp-*) 
called into WM at the same time. Upon their appellation into WM, the current link between 
them has a strong value (Strength =0.9984). It means that in the past cognitive cycles, this 
pair of codelet has been called several times into WM. As we can see, after their meeting at 
the first cycle considered in the illustration, they have not been called into WM for the next 
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14 cycles, so they lost some of their association strength with the passage of time. With their 
common recall into WM at cycles 16 and 30, their link reinforced, followed with forgetting. 
Up After the 30th cycle, they have never been recalled into WM. In fact their relations (links 
between them with its energy) decreased constantly. 
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Figure 4.11 Strengths between codelets in forgetting scenario 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
0998401 0.998376 0.998351 0.998273 0.998299 0.998273 0.998246 0.998218 0.998191 0.998162 0.998134 0.998105 
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
0.998075 0.998045 0.998015 0.998299 0.998273 0.998246 0.998218 0.998191 0.998162 0.998134 0.998075 0.998045 
25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 
0.998015 0.997984 0.997952 0.99792 0.998218 0.998191 0.998162 0.998134 0.998105 0.998075 0.998045 0.998015 
Table 4.1 Strength values between Codelet-Info-Event-*, Codelet-Info-Event-Timestamp-* 
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Now we discuss about different scenarios that could happen in CTS memory. Figure 4.12 
shows learning and forgetting scenarios in CTS' WM. The solid (blue dark) curve (Codelet­
Info-Joint-SY and Codelet-Info-Component-SR) shows how the strength of a link grows if a 
pair of codelets is brought back into WM as soon as it leaves it, never being exposed to 
"memory loss". The link between codelets is constantly reinforced while they spend time 
together in WM. The dashed pink (dark) curve shows a different scenario. Leaming starts and 
continues up to the 50th cycle, followed by a short "memory loss" (during a few cycles spent 
outside WM), then the two codelets meet again in WM, reinforcing their link for a brief 
period. After about 25 cycles outside WM where their association weakens, they see a final 
learning episode. You will note that forgetting follows a softer slope than for learning. With 
the third, yellow (bright) curve, we can observe a third scenario for the link between two 
codelets: it is created, grows initially, then when one codelet disappears from WM and never 
comes back, its association eventually vanishes. 
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Figure 4.12 Learning and forgetting between codelets in CTS 
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With this mechanism, CTS uses an unsupervised machine learning strategy that accomplishes 
a selectionist adaptation of the agent. This is appropriate, as system does not know ahead of 
time which codelet will enter WM and which codelet will eventually form the next coalition. 
Computationally speaking, ail information about the new computed strength is saved, to be 
used in the next cognitive cycle or when the agent is reactivated for a new session.ln this kind 
of Hebbian learning7, agent uses an unsupervised machine learning strategy. As we can 
observe above, link values between different codelets changes according to the cognitive 
cycles and the time that they passed together in WM. In the first premier steps, the increase 
level of learning is started by small amount then after sorne cognitive cycles incremented 
faster with bigger amount. 
7 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hebbian_learning 
68 
4.10 Procedural learning in CTS 
There are two ways for procedural learning; the first one is creating new behaviour nodes. 
After a scheme is chose (because, among other rules, its context for execution becomes true), 
an action is executed which then spawns an expectation codelet to bring to consciousness the 
result of the executed action. In the next step, the agent decides to create a new procedural 
node according to the novelty of task or reinforce the existing link activation degree if current 
task already exist (D'Mello, S. K., et al.,2006). 
The other procedural learning in crs is the implicit procedural learning. Each rime astate 
(pre-conditions showed as triangular in Figur 4.13) becomes true, CTS learning mechanism 
make a copy of executed codelets (Figure 4.13., the small blue circles in the rectangular 
shows codelets). In this method, the links value of each node (nodes showed as the 
rectangular in the Figure 4.13) executed in the behavior network with its subsequence node 
will get reinforced. In the future executions, each time the same two codelets get fire by 
behavior network, links between nodes will get reinforced .The traces of the executed nodes 
will be saved as the learned paths. 
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Figure 4.13 Part of CTS' behavior network concerned with offering support. 
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4.11	 Implicit procedurallearning in CTS 
D'Mello (D'Mello, S. K., et al., 2006) proposed some procedural learning in LIDA 
that adds new nodes in its schema net. Here we mainly propose complementary procedural 
learning mechanisms that effect implicit procedural learning, "implicit" having two possible 
meanings here: that the learning happens unconsciously, and that the representation takes a 
sub-symbolic form (which cannot be used in conceptual manipulations). The resulting benefit 
of this learning on the implicit structures is faster operations (but not the achievement of 
automatic actions that are set-off and executed unconsciously). In human beings, executing a 
specific task with multiple steps requires to concentrate on the execution of each step 
individually, until we may become so familiar with the procedure that we can do it almost 
automatically. In such cases, we accelerate, even automatize the execution and eventually 
combine steps to reach the final goal more rapidly. We may also have accelerated the 
decision process that Jeads to the selection and triggering of an act. 
To achieve this, we propose two different kinds of learning in CTS' Behavior Network. 
We also propose an explicit, high-level learning in the BN that aims at lowering 
consciousness and attention mechanism involvement, in accordance to a natural phenomenon 
recently revealed. Transiting know-how to unconscious operations does not just achieve 
speed gains, but also incurs reduced brain activity, a boon for energy conservation. 
Before examining the learning processes, we need to present a few more notions about 
CTS' architecture. The BN is a high-Ievel procedural memory, a network of partial plans that 
analyses the context to decide whot ta do, which behavior to set off. This structure is linked 
to the latent knowledge of how to do things in the form of inactive code lets. In fact, External 
stimuli are interpreted by CTS' perceptual mechanism and written into WM, where it may 
then be chosen by the attention mechanism to be presented to consciousness. That broadcast 
information may either assert preconditions for the initiation of a behavior in BN. Or it may 
cause reaction by another part of the system, which then creates the necessary preconditions 
for firing a behavior. When a behavior is chosen, it activates the codelets that implement it. 
Each behavior node, just as a codelets, has a base-Ievel activation, which can increase 
or decrease. Until it is selected for execution, a behavior node accumulates energy from the 
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various sources in the BN (feelings, state nodes, other nodes) but they are at the same time 
submitted to a constant loss of activation. Links between the nodes are concerned with energy 
too: they learn that way, and they weaken when not used (when the nodes they link are not 
selected for execution. This mimics human beings: if we do not repeat a task for a whi1e, we 
wililose sorne of our ability, forgetting with the passage of time. 
We now come to the description of our implicit proceduralleaming mechanisms. 
4.12 First-Level Learning: Learning Through Experience. 
In the first level of implicit learning in the BN, two types of reinforcement learning take 
place: in the links and by the elevation of behavior nodes' base-Ievel activation (Faghihi,U., et 
al.,2007). In the first type, links are reinforced between behaviors that execute in sequence 
(Figure 4.14.a). This reinforcement makes the BN more goal-driven, more sensitive to the 
energy coming from the feelings (top-leveJ motivators in the BN) by aIJowing their top-down 
a) Learning by b) Learning by 
reinlorcing links reinlorclng base 
levelactivation 01 
b e h a v 10 r n 0 des 
Figure 4.14 Two modes of implicit proceduraJ reinforcement Jearning for CTS. 
stimulation to be amplified when the energy circulates backward in the planning phase 
(towards the "Ieafs" of the streams). It results in a faster planning and an increased probability 
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these nodes will be selected for execution next time by being the first ones reaching the 
activation threshold. The base-level activation in the links is computed with a sigmoid 
function, the same as for learning of regularities in WM. As a concrete example, if crs often 
detects the need for support about planning the path for the payJoad (refer to Figure 4.15), the 
sequence concerned with this will fire faster and feel more responsive. 
A second type of "first-level" learning happens by the elevation of the base-level 
activation of an act node in the BN (Figure 4.14.b) by the intervention of expectation 
codelets. Each action in the BN that is selected for execution reJeases at least one expectation 
codelet (our implementation of ideas from Cleeremans, A., et al, 1998) that monitors the 
result of the act. If the result corresponds to the expectation, it is not brought to consciousness 
(Cleeremans, A., et al, 1998) and (Baars, B. J., 1997).The expectation codelet "si/ently" (not 
going throllgh the conscious broadcasts) sends energy that reinforces the base-Ievel activation 
of its node. However, if the result did not meet expectations, then inhibition is sent that 
diminishes the node's base-level energy; the expectation codelet also tries to have the 
negative result brought to consciousness - these negative results may eventually produce a 
suspension-codelet (sorne active codelets ,for suspending current task)or induce activation of 
a repair sequence in the BN. That sort of learning would make the BN more sensitive to the 
context, more reacti ve because an act that had success in the past possesses a higher base­
level activation and is more likely to be selected for execution on reoccllrrence of the same 
context. When this act receives contextual energy (both bottom-up energy coming from an 
external stimulus and top-down energy coming fromfeelings), its (base-level) pre-activation 
adds to the energy received; the node will already be more excited than others and has higher 
probabilities to be selected by the BN Manager. 
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Figure 4.15 Learning and forgetting between behavior nodes in CTS Behavior Network 
4.12.1 Second-Level Learning: Partial Automatization. 
In human beings, sorne high-Ievel decisional processes such as decisional selective attention 
and decisional integration become more efficient with learning (Maddox, W. T., 2002). We 
have implemented this general idea with a second-level of implicit, Ieal'ning in SN: partial 
automatization. Here, not only are links made stronger, but the SN behaves in a different way 
so that fewer cycles through the access "consciousness" are required to complete a task. 
When the threshold is reached in the link between two act nodes, then the state node between 
them modifies its behavioral response. It will, from now on, automatically get activated by 
simply hearing the "consciousness"' publication declaring the activation (this happen when 
nodes preconditions became true) of the behavior it follows, instead of having to wait to hear 
the expected result of that behavior. This learning is applicable where an operation is broken 
down in small steps (often for the benefit of the SN designer or those who need to read it 
later on). It also applies to intermediary states with no meaning that exist only to satisfy the 
BN design constraints. 
When comparing Figure 4.12 and Figure 4.15, one can conclude that in crs, 
procedural learning needs less cognitive cycles than perceptual learning. In the same 
scenario, perceptual learning needs 85 cognitive cycles for sigmoid function saturation, 
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whereas in procedural learning, nodes need only 45 cognitive cycles (black dashed curve) ta 
see their sigmoid function saturate. 
4.12.2 Third-Level implicit procedural Learning: Lowering Further Consciousness 
Involvement (under design). 
To execute a new (not automatized) task, the brain takes into service a lot of neurons which 
help by processing the various aspects. After the progressive, iterative learning of the task, it 
seems that only neUf"OnS that realize a direct mapping between the stimulus and the response 
remain involved (Gilbert, C. D., et al., 2001). When we learn to do something (for example, 
swimmjng), in our first attempts, we need to think and respect each step, the way of moving 
legs, hands, etc. But after a while, we do ail of the movements without thinking, without 
bringing each step into consciousness, bypassing unnecessary explicit processing. 
This third-level of implicit learning for CTS (still in the design and development 
process), offers the possibility for the fusion of extra steps, which will implement the 
complete idea of efficiency: the system will keeps alive only codelets that are of absolute 
relevance with the tasks at hand (Gilbert, C. D., et al., 2001). Before learning, the agent needs 
to execute every step of a procedure consciously. After some reuse of the procedure, there is 
the possibility for fusion of behaviors (for example fusing Act1 and Act2 in Figure 4.14)" 
Thus after a while, the agent is capable of executing a task "without thinking", thanks to the 
creation of a new behavior that synthesizes those it replaces. This learning in CTS is possible 
by creating an appropriate collaboration among Domain Model (DM), Leal"ner Model (LM) 
and the learning mechanism. However, at this time DM and LM have not impJemented 
completely in CTS. Therefore we cannot experiment this in a concrete manner. As a tutor, 
CTS can leam a procedure and then decide how to fuse certain acts. This, has nol been 
implemented yet, and could constitute the work of a complete doctoral thesis. 
4.12.3 Implicit procedurallearning in CTS implementation phase 
For implicit procedural learning implementation, as we mentioned above. Learning 
Mechanisms try to detect all preconditions which will fire a behaviour in the behaviour net. 
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Or it may generate reaction by another part of the system, which then creates the necessary 
preconditions for firing a behaviour. The same way as perceptual learning, when Software 
executed, LM try to bring back ail previously activated stated (Iearned) with their relative 
codelets which saved in ("C:\\LearningStateParameter.txt") file. Then it makes a temporary 
copy file for updates and any comparison with actual states and their relative codelets in the 
Scene. Each node has at least one precondition, sorne direct links with other codelets and 
links between code lets have Strengths (the same as perceptual learning mechanism). 
public class LearningStateFields 
private State StateName;
 
private String StateAssociatedCodelet;
 
private double strength;
 
public LearningStateFields(State sa, String codelet, double 
strength) ( 
this.StateName = sa; 
this.StateAssociatedCodelet codelet; 
this.strength = strength; 
strengths.add(strength) ; 
times.add(System.currentTimeMillis()) ; 
Next codes, task is loading up ail previously learned states with their relative codelets into 
WM. 
for(Iterator iter = broadcast.iterator() ;iter.hasNext();) (
 
Codelet t = (Codelet)iter.next();
 
System.out.println(""+t.getName()) ;
 
}
 
Subsequently, sorne codelets observing the Scene tries to register happening events which 
could be capturing active states (Pre-conditions), their linked codelets and the code lets links 
with other codelets. Links between codelets follows perceptual strategy that a link may obtain 
strength (if it is new in the Scene) or its current strength with others increase/decrease 
according the time it passes with others in WM. 
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Il LearningStateFields 
oldStateValue=LearningStateParameterSaving.getInstance() .addNewSta 
teLearningStrength(sa); 
IINew getTriggeringCodelet
 
sl=sa.getName()+". "+sa.getTriggeringCodelet();
 
IINew State
 
System.out.printlnl"Add State"+
 
sa.connections(ConnectionType.ADDITION_CONNECTION .number()l);
 
Now the same as perceptual learning, if codelet is new then we create a list of 
connections with others active in procedural network. Called code lets into WM will receive 
more energy for their links, and if they leave WM then, their links with other might lose 
energy. Loosing energies in the links follows the same scenario as perceptual learning 
(sigmoid function): 
double value=oldState.getStrengths() .getlchainSize-l);
 
if(value != 0) {
 
Il decreaseStateStrength
 
oldState. iiecreaseStateStrengtl} (value) ;
 
And at the end of software execution, ail data rnight be saved: 
LearningStateParameterSaving. getInstance () . saveToFile ("C: \ \LearningS 
tateParameter.txt"); 
4.13 Causal Learning (Underway) 
Laura Schulz (Schulz, L. E., and Sommerville, J., 2006) described causal knowledge 
as crucial and mysterious. Knowing causes, we can change the outcome of situations, which 
may be crucial. But we have to find relations between events, how they affect outcome; these 
relations must be inferred. Making inferences can be educated, but the result is never certain; 
it depends on previous knowledge, available mental tools (or algorithms), and how weil these 
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are mastered. It may also depend on the ability to interpret what is perceived. If a group of 
people see something as a plastic chunk, but others see the same thing as a pen, what's the 
difference between the first group and the second one? In the first group, people acquire just 
input/output knowledge without any interpretation. In ua knowledge, for each input, system 
allocates an output. In comparison, for the second group, interpretation plays an important 
role. Interpretation helps to distinguish subjects or events better than simple ua processing. 
Reconstruction of knowledge8 helps humans to reconstruct the system with its events 
details in case of doubt. In reality ua method seems ideal For most application (Lebiere, c., 
et al., 1998) even in complex systems. ACT-R uses a computational model to acquire 
knowledge. It uses sub-symbolic form of "structural knowledge" to produce interpreted data 
for systems events and "states". However by adding causal interpretation, subjects learned 
"structural knowledge" aspects with appropriate associations between system events which 
called implicit learning by author (Wolfgang, S., 2002). In other word, structural 
knowledge's are useful when no relevant information Find about reconstruction of states in 
the memory (of the system). Though, to gain high performance, using structural knowledge 
mechanism is crucial. ACT-R system is useful for causal judgment tasks, but il is unable to 
recognize and interprets interaction between explicit and implicit knowledge for irrelevant 
stimuli about a new task. When we need to recognize something il' s easier to work with ua 
knowledge. For decision tasks, however, structural knowledge is preferable. Wolfgang (in 
Wolfgang, S., 2002) showed that when an agent forms its knowledge by adding "Structural 
knowledge" information, then this information is useful in interpretation steps and the same 
when human require constructing a choice according presented causes. 
Causal Learning did not implemented in CTS. However, accordingly we plan to 
implement a similar leal'ning method in the future in our cognitive agent. In Learning of 
Environmental Regularities, we added strength to the link between two codelets. As we 
mentioned before, that link may allow the formation of a future coalition if it crosses a 
strength threshold. Thus, creating new links between codelets and stabilizing those 
associations that correspond to Frequent occurrences accomplish the detection of ua 
knowledge. In fact, CTS perceives its environment and in reasoning phase, search through 
HSrnlctulal knowledge (Wikipeclia): abOlit how concepts ale inlerrelated. can neilhel be fOlmally stated nOI automalically 
plocessed 
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the saved causes related to the CUITent event happening now. As an example, when CTS', 
gives lessons to the astronauts, if astronaut is novice and forget a crucial step (camera 
adjustment), CTS' has to interrupt astronaut by (giving advice, making trouble for him/here, 
etc). Ali of this information will save as an Acyclic directed graphs (A Bayesian network9 
which is Ha calculus for rational belief assignment") for next utilization; our agent might 
detect, understand and remember such a similar situation with their causes. Griffiths 
(Griffiths, T.L., et al., 2004), showed some examples of causal learning using the Baysien 
approach to make the next decision faster without using the same resources and processes or 
use these sort of causes to make unseen situation (Reasoning). Each time system approves a 
cause (Figure 4.16), links value between codelets related to the current event will receive 
more energy and learning mechanism will assign to the current event one (or some) proved 
causal Codelets automatically. Proved cause is saved into a Causal Memory (which is in 
relation with Conceptual memory) when the access consciousness broadcasts the information. 
Thus, during a task execution, when situation is examined, a mechanism reviews the Causal 
Memory to flnd similar situations that happened before. If found, such events already 
happened, then associated Codelets will receive more energy. New energy will update into 
the Causal Memory. If system cannot find the same or similar events (that happened before) 
new event with its associated causes (Codelets) will be created in the Causal Memory. 
A causal Bayesian nelwork(Wikipedia) is a Bayesian nelwork where the (lireCled arcs of lhe graph are inlerpreted as 
represenling causal relalions in sorne real dornain. The direcled arcs do nol have to be inlerpreled as represenling causal 
relalions; however in praclice knowledge aboul causal relations is very oflen used as a guide in drawing Bayesian nelwork 
graphs. thus resulting in causal Bayesian nelworks. 
9 
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cid: Causal Leaming 
Le.mer Model 
Proved Cause & Event 
Figure 4.16, CTS Causal Leaming Mechanism 
In this way, the causal interpretation for each link in causal memory appears into a coalition. 
In addition, coalitions with proved causes gain more precise knowledge and additional energy 
than others for consciousness broadcasting phase in CTS, which helps different modules 
answer correctly to the broadcasted information. We propose a combination of observation 
and intervention to learn causal interpretation in which, it conduct us to causal learning. 
System can estimate the probability of each links between two codelets, to insist in the next 
coalition by Baysian lO net formalism. 
10 Wikipedia:A causal Bayesian network is a Bayesian nelwork where the direcled arcs of the graph are interpreled as 
represenling causal relations in sorne real domain. The direcled arcs do nol have to be inlerpreled as representing causal 
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For example: 
Codelet-Info-Collision-* in WM caused presence of
 
Codelet-Info-Station-Element-S1PlTrussRightOl
 
Codelet-Info-Distance-*
 
Codelet-Info-Joint-WE
 
It means Collision, appear when a joint (Codelet-Info-Joint-WE) approach's to one 
of the 551 elements in the space. The cause cou Id be astronaut distraction, fatigue or etc, 
which current causes might be coded as a part of coalition to be used in next or similar event. 
relations: however in praclice knowledge about causal relations is very ohen used as a guide in drawing Bayesian nelwork 
graphs. thus resulting in causal Bayesian nelworks. 
5.1 
CHAPTER V 
COMPARISON WITH OTHER WORKS 
In this chapter. we will compare our architecture with three other works focusing on 
their learning dimensions. It consists of a comparison with Franklin architecture, which we 
raise and justify the modifications (for learning mechanism). Then, we compare three popular 
architectures as BOl Agents (a general architecture of agent), CLARION (a cognitive agent), 
ACT-R (aspire to be general computational models of cognition) 
Comparison with LIDA architecture 
l organized a brief comparison between LIDA and CTS learning aspects in table 5.1. 
LIDA (Franklin, 2006) CTS(2006) 
Perceptual Learning(Explicit) ---------------
Episodic Learning ------------- ­
Attention Learning Learning of Environmental Regularities 
(lmplicitlExplicit) 
Procedural Learning(Explicit) Procedural Learning(lmplicitlExplicit) 
Meta-Cognition Learning(fusion of actions) 
[Underway] 
Emotional Learning [Underway] 
Table 5.1, Companson between LIDA and CTS. 
1- The first difference between CTS and LIDA is that we actuall y have no perceptual or 
episodic learning in our agent. As ail entities that produce events (danger, motion, menu, 
etc) in virtual world are predefined in CTS, which was not a priority in building our 
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prototype. CTS' perception functionality is different from LIDA's. LIDA use a Slipnet 
mechanism to understand and gi ve the premier meaning to the received information. In 
comparison, CTS uses a simpler semantic network. 
Presently our group is working on various memory aspects (cllrrently excilisively based 
on the "Sparse Distributed Memory" algorithm, as in LIDA) to give episodic learning 
capability to the agent. 
2- We propose unconscious learning for the learning of environmental reglilarities (based 
on Jackson's theory and on real experimentations with humans by psychologists); LIDA 
uses just consciousness for learning (based on Baars Global Workspace theory). In fact, 
we propose paralJel tasks accomplishment by CTS and at the same time different type of 
learning. We implemented a way that when agent executes a special task, at the same 
time, it can receive information from its virtual world, and learn in parallel (Faghihi,U., 
et al .,2007). 
3- Implicit procedural learning, 
3-a) our method to accomplish automatization of routine processes is different. Franklin 
proposed a way to automatize the execution of behaviour streams (Franklin, S., 2005). 
Although it is founded on Jackson's ideas, it relies on the intervention of attention 
code lets that progressively fade out of the repeating process. We implement the 
automatization of streams around the same idea of repetition of usage, but in the higher­
Ievel structure, the BN. Links are reinforced between behaviour nodes instead then 
between codelets. Our approach remains somewhat further to the biological model but is 
able to reproduce the phenomenon of faster reactions with practice. In our manner of 
doing, the BN becomes then more goal-driven, more sensitive to the energy coming from 
the feelings. Then agent executes and achieves its goal faster. By this notion, CTS is 
more adaptable to the changes in its environment. 
3-b) Implicit bias towards successful behaviours 
LIDA as weil as CTS reinforce their successful behaviours. In LIDA, it happens through 
it mechanism that learns new schemes or reinforces an existing one's base-level 
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activation (D'Mello, S. K., et al., 2006). They describe the role of expectation codelets in 
this mechanism. CTS also use expectation codelets for the same goal, but in a way that 
differs on two accounts. First, whereas LillA sees its expectation code lets try to bring 
back to consciousness the resliit of the action, experimentations of Curran and Keele 
(Curran, T., Keele, and S.W., 1993) proved that in procedural tasks, hllman beings 
execute the task and learn at the same time without necessarily bringing the result of each 
action into consciousness. Action results are brought back into consciousness when they 
are wrong, except if voluntary attention is devoted to awaiting the result. Of course, the 
second difference is that reinforcement of successful behaviours happens thanks to 
conscious broadcasts. In CTS, reinforcement is accomplished "sUently", at the 
unconscious level, not making use of conscious broadcasts. 
3-c) The brain in human beings, to accomplish a procedural task, allocates sorne related 
and unrelated neurons. After the few first executions, the brain activity will decrease. It 
means that just related neurons for accomplishing the task will remain active, thus crs 
might accomplishes the task and learn them without using the same (quantity of) 
resources that were allocated in the first executions. 
5.2 Comparison with BD! architecture 
The information about the environ ment in the BD! architecture is described as beliefs. 
Desires indicate the set of current goals that agent wants to attain; desires are reciprocally 
exclusive. One of the intentions is selected to become the active desire. There is a library of 
plans defined in BD! mode!. Any change in the environ ment will be reflected as events. 
Event-queue saves the order of events that happened during the implementation of plans in 
the agent. 
In CTS, information (represented by information codelets) on the Scene and active States are 
our representation of the world. Thus, they correspond to the agent's beliefs. The Feelings and 
Desires (with our meaning of the word) nodes of the procedural network are similar to the 
initial intentions (with our meaning of the word) of CTS, and they guide the choice of other 
"sub-"intentions. Feeling and Desire nodes, because they are not used to satisfy another 
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5.3 
intention, are top-goals in themselves, but until an action is selected in the BN and fires (thus 
becoming an intention (BD! meaning)), they remain in the l'ole of "desires" (BD! meaning). 
The behaviour nodes in the Behavior Network may consecutively take the role of BD! desires 
and BD! intentions. 
Being a cognitive architecture that implements a richer version of BD!, CTS architecture is 
better adapted to an intelligent tutorial system than the plain BD! mode!. Perception may 
make only fast recognition of the situation, it detecting whether there exists a collision or any 
other pressing danger. That may trigger an alarm reaction that bypasses ail the deliberative 
processes. Later on, the danger will be broadcasted in theatre with information codelets 
bringing more information on the scene. 
As soon as this information is broadcasted, the agent will continue to interpret the situation 
by revision of its memories ("If this problem happened before'?"), different modules which 
detect broadcasted information will answer. Next time, if agent perceives the same or a 
similar situation, the same code lets will be invoked, and transfer to consciousness. 
Consequently, the answer will happen faster than in previous invocations. CTS', learns step 
by step with reinforcement that come from environment. Furthermore, CTS can internally 
revise ail of its actions and can modify them if needed (when we implement the necessary 
behaviour streams in theBN). CTS is capable to distinguish priorities of goals set by its 
various parts (Learner and Domain models, among others) and select the most important, 
urgent, and relevant event. 
Comparison with ACT-R 
ACT-R (1990) architecture implements human cognition mode!. ACT-R performances are 
frequently compared with that human beings reaction to check if the architecture produces 
similar results (Anderson, 1. R., and Lebiere, c., 2003). 
ACT-R is the best-validated simulation of human beings cognition theory (ACT-R; e.g., 
Anderson, 1. R., and Lebiere, C., 1998). ACT-R uses a modular architecture which consists 
of a central pan with a set of buffers that permit indirect communication between different 
modules in the system. 
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ACT-R consists of different modules (Figure 5.1) such as a perceptual ("visual") module for 
recognizing the objects, a goal module who' s task is current goal and intention pursuing, 
declarative memory module for recovering information from the memory and procedural 
module for controlling agent's movements (or actions, in generaJ). In this architecture, 
modules cannot communicate directly: any communication must pass through "central 
production system". Each buffer contains one declarative piece of facts, called a "chunk". 
Such a "chunk" consists ofa name and labelled links towards others "chunks", this forming a 
"semantic network". The inference module modifies the content of buffers followiog a set of 
rules called "productions". 
Each production rule is composed of conditions (which indicate to which configuration, or 
content, of the buffers it is applicable) and actions (indicates how it modifies the buffers). 
ACT-R uses the production rules to solve procedural problems (for example a mathematical 
subtraction). These rules are specific to the application, but ACT-R provides meta-ru les ta 
choose and execute a particular rule, because in each cycle there is only one rule that can be 
carried out by the system. Cognitive cycles in ACT-R start by finding a pattern for external or 
internai image of the world which corresponds to the buffers; then a production rule is 
triggered, and then buffers will be updated for the next cognitive cycle. This complete cycle 
Iength is estimated at about SOms; in LIDA the same cycle is granted about 200ms. 
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Exterllal World
 
Figure 5.1, ACT-R 5.0 Architecture 
Learning in ACT-R is possible for both of chunks and production rules at the symbolic and 
Sub-symbolic level ("knowledge structure"). Implicit learning in ACT-R is possible by a 
particular declarative chunk that can be fetched and examined and explicit Jearning could be 
the results of learning goals .The chunk resulted from a goal (the solution), will gain its base­
Level energy and store into declarative memory. Next time, when system called the same task, 
the result according to the preYiously stored activation of chunk will be recovered from 
declarative memory instead of recalculating it again. 
A· B· + ~W· S,· 
1 1 LJ J JI 
J 
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In this formula, Bi is the base-level activation of the chunk i, Wj shows the sum of noticed 
weighting for each components j which currently detected by the attentional part of the 
system, and Sji depicts the strength of association from each component j. 
Sometimes a goal could be achieved through a complex process, and then a "dependency 
goal" will create by the system to understand and save how the problem solved. Next time 
when the same or similar goal happens, the "Production ruie" is accessible to solve the 
problem in a single step. 
Sub-symbolic Learning, happen, when system uses production rules to attain a goal (useful 
experiences). The target here is making existing symbolic knowledge more available. The 
chunk which is often used, become more active. Production parameters will be updated by 
experience (it could increase/decrease the probability of happening such a production in the 
future). Each time a chunk called its base-Ievel will increases and the strength of association 
between the current sources and the chunk is also increased. 
As a brief comparison between ACT-R and LillA, ACT-R does not focus on consciousness 
as much as LillA. ACT-R is not equipped with an episodic memory. Learning in LillA 
happens after information is broadcasted by Consciousness. It means agent learn when 
attention mechanism bring appropriate information to the consciousness. In fact, LillA learn 
explicitly, but, ACT-R learn both implicit and explicitly. 
Meta-cognition was not addressed in ACT-R. 
ACT-R symbolic and sub-symbolic incorporation is similar to LillA. However, ACT­
R symbolic level is focused on production rules and chunks, whereas the sub-symbolic level 
is made of various parallel processes modeled by a collection of equations. One of ACT-R 
limits is its difficulty concerning development and implementation by new users. 
Development phases in ACT-R, need raising a complicated model of the cognitive task. 
ACT-R did not address the social impact of the software and is not a "generative" theory. 
ACT-R is unable to explain the ascending learning of explicit knowledge and the interaction 
between expl icit and implicit knowledge. In ACT-R, the rules for ail situations must be 
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specified in advance. ACT-R did not answer that in implicit learning what type of knowledge 
could be learned? 
Remaining questions about ACT-R architecture are: 
1.	 In ACT-R ,"In the symbolic knowledge representation , maybe it is more 
acceptable to use symbol grounding or symbol tethering to create a better 
representation of the world (physic and social)" . 
2.	 Another question about ACT-R architecture is: "How could we model 
language grammars that construct from rules, sub-rules, exceptions with a 
clear distinction and justification between different categories". 
3.	 "The most important part of expertise in human being is intuitive, immediate 
and unconscious, then is it truthful, valid, to produce human cognitive 
processes as a production system, which are explicit and precise?". Production 
rules are simply the expressive units and not more. 
4.	 Human cognition operates on a complex social environment and is situated in 
the real world. Creation of cognition needs social interactions, cultural 
background, common language, and etc. ACT-R did not address these 
important issues in its architecture. 
Comparison with CLARlüN 
CLARlüN (Connectionist Learning with Adoptive Rule Induction ON-line) (Ron Sun, et al. 
1998,2001, 2005), is aimed at obtaining various cognitive processes within a single cognitive 
architecture. Il is a cognitive modules-based agent. Il investigate interactions between 
different parts with respect to procedural and declarative knowledge) of an agent by 
integrating connectionist, reinforcement, and symbolic Jearning methods to obtain several 
learning abilities, such as "bottom-up learning ll ", "trial-and-error learning", "top-down 
Il Bottom-up learning: Learning mal goes From implicit lo explicil knowledge (Ron Sun et al, 2004). 
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learning", using "cognition-motivation" when the agent interacts with its environment 
("meta-cognitive interactions"). Ron Sun proposed a middle level between 
"phenomenologyl2" and "physiology/neurobiology" for encapsulating basic characteristics of 
consciousness. 
The most important challenge in the CLARION architecture is interactions between implicit 
and explicit knowledge that an agent acquire from its environment. To represent both implicit 
and explicit knowledge, the architecture uses two separate parts. In fact, different 
abilities/expertise (procedural knowledge) can be obtained by a back-propagation l3 network. 
However, the implicit characteristics of proceduraJ abilities/expertise, features of such 
abilities/expertise are not accessible to consciousness (Anderson, J. R., 1983; Reber, A. S., 
1989). In this architecture, explicit (declarative) knowledge is achieved through a symbolic 
representation by computational features of the system. Such information is more accessible 
to consciousness. Ron Sun proposed a distributed system with sub-systems that ail separate 
implicit knowledge from explicit knowledge. Bach sub-system has two levels; top level 
encodes explicit knowledge and the bottom level encodes implicit knowledge. 
In figure 5.2, ACS (the "action-centered sub-system") controls internai and external actions. 
NACS ("non-action-centered subsystem") role is to support explicit and implicit knowledge 
about the world, in which performs as a motivator and gives correspondent feedback to 
different part of the system (perception, action, cognition, etc). MS is the motivational 
subsystem for feedback proposes. MCS ("meta-cognitive subsystem") observes ACS and ail 
the other sub-systems of the agent, their activities and operations in order to change them 
when needed (for example, when new feedback is received). CLARION is equipped with a 
procedural memory, a declarative memory and an episodic memory. 
In the other word, in this architecture top level encodes explicit declarative knowledge; 
bottom level encodes implicit procedural knowledge. 
12 Phenomenology(answers.com): A philosophy or met/wd ojïnquiry based on Ihe premise Illai reality comisls a] abjects and 
events as I/leY are perceived or underslood i," human rOIlSl'iousness and '101 ofanyllting independefll a]hwnan cOlISciou,mess. 
13 Buck-propagation (Wikipedia) :A ('()lIllllon melhod a] training a neuralnel in whirh Ihe inilial syslem OU/PUI is' col1lpared la 
Ihe desired oUlput. and Ihe system is adjusled umil the difference beMeen the Mo is minimized. 
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Figure 5.2, CLARIONarchitecture (Anderson 2004) 
In this architecture, cognition performs as a bridge between the needs and motivations of 
agent with its environments. The model and its leaming processes enable an autonomous 
learning mechanism. Learning is accomplished by the integration of reinforcement learning 
and rule induction, so that the resulting process is included automatically in the structure. 
Implicit learning ("bottom-up") happens at the bottom level with supervised learning ("back­
propagation network") by adjusting input/output parameters. 
Explicit learning happens by turning acquired knowledge from implicit knowledge into 
symbolic representations. In fact, explicit knowledge is an extraction and refinement of 
information that was captured from interaction with environment (implicit knowledge). 
Conversely, explicit knowledge will be integrated into the bottom level after it becomes 
stable. 
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The agent explores its environment and tries to acquire information or modify it (for 
example, hypothesis testing without the help of bottom level). The action selection 
mechanism in CLARION is formed by different top/bottom levels. There exist input and 
output for both levels. Astate entered from the environment into the system will be analysed 
at first, and then an appropria te action will be alJocated, according to the considered goal. 
The feedback will be leamed and saved for future uses. In fact, the feedback cou Id be 
translated into "rules" and "chunk". Each action took by the bottom level will produce anode 
with some related rules in the top level after extraction of explicit rule and then it will refined 
by future interactions with external world. Some existing node in the bottom level may be 
relevant to the condition of rules that linked to a sole node at the top level which could 
indicate condition recognized as a chunk node. Another important characteristic which may 
be used for social behaviours is motivational aspects. Without it, the agent is purposeless. 
With this mechanism, the agent is capable of creating automatically proper feedback from 
environment without extra coding or receiving feedback from its environment. 
A comparison between CLARION and Baars' model shows that CLARION takes into 
account the integration of inputs from sensory or devices, global reliability, and integrity of 
consciousness. As explained in Baars' (1988) model, a large number of Codelets accomplish 
unconscious processing, and the global workspace synchronizes and manages their activities 
through a broadcasting overall the system. This model carries some similarity to CLARrON. 
Unconscious Codelets could be considered as the bottom-level of CLARION; and global 
workspace cou Id be considered as its top-level which "synthesizes" bottom-level modules. 
CLARION does not work as much as Baars to internai uniformeness and its architecture has 
partial functionality in the emersion of consciousness (Marcel, A., 1983). 
Global broadcasting in Baars' model cou Id be considered as the incorporation between top 
and bottom level representation, scattered within multiple modules in CLARrON that will 
conduct to the unity of consciousness. However, various learning mechanisms (episodic, 
attention, emotional) have not addressed directly by CLARrON. At the theoretical level, 
CLARrON uses a supervised connectionist network for the procedural module (implicit), that 
is, rests on feedbacks to accomplish its bottom-Ievel learning, whereas experiments with 
human beings relating to implicit learning usually do not provide feedback to the subjects 
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(Cleeremans, A, 1997; Cleeremans, A., et al., 1998; Curran, T., Keele, S.W., 1993). Maybe, 
it is better to use non-supenJised connectionist sub-symbolic networks for procedural modules 
(Hélie, S., 2007). CLARION uses distributed representations to represent implicit knowledge, 
whereas these latter should be characterized by sub-symbolic mechanism. 
5.5 Comparison between different architectures 
At this point, we compare our architecture with three popular architectures explained 
brief! y in this chapter. 
LillA ACT-R CLARION
 
CTS(2006)
(Franklin, 2006)
 
Perceptual Explicit Learning Explicit Learning Learning of Environmental
 
Learning(Explicit)
 
Regularities (lmplicitlExplicit)
 
Episodic Learning Implicit Implicit Procedural Learning
 
Learning Learning (Implicit)
 
Attention ---_.._-------- Meta-Cognition
 
Learning Learning
 
--------.-.----
Procedural ----._--------- -------------- ­
--------.------Learning
 
--------------- --------------- --------------- Emotional Learning
 
[Underway]
 
Table 5.2, Compal'lson between L1DA, ACT-R. CLARION and CTS
 
CHAPITRE VI 
CONCLUSION 
The CTS architecture is the product of an on-going research of the GDAC group 
(Research laboratory for knowledge management, dissemination and acquisition) at UQAM 
(Université du Québec à Montréal). CTS is a complex software agent. 
The cognitively-oriented software agents explained in this survey are helping us 
comprehend the notions underlying learning of environmental regularities and procedural 
leaming. The learning of environmental regularities in CTS is inspired from Jackson's 
extension te Selfridge's Pandemonium theory. Our implementations are inspired by both 
selectionist and instructionalist approaches. They respect what is generally accepted 
knowledge about psychological and biological mechanisms (parts of Baars' neuro­
psychological theory, Cleeremans' research). The equations that drive learning in CTS are 
based on weil established studies (Hebbian learning and forgetting curve). Furthermore, they 
happen concurrently in our agent. We believe that if we want to attain humanly levels of 
performance in general intelligence, it is important that we stay close to neuropsychological 
studies, even is by iteratively reaching that goal in successive efforts. 
We offered two kinds of incremental learning mechanisms that place the basis for a 
cognitive architecture capable of human-like learning at theoreticaJ, design and 
computational levels. In fact, leaming in CTS could be summarized as a combination of low­
level (continuous) learning with high-level ("symbolic") learning of entities relationships. 
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These learning mechanisms will al10w CTS to better adapt to its environment and 
perform its tasks more swiftly. By integrating emotionaJ learning in crs, we expect that new 
knowledge easily join together with the old one. Ergo, parallel tasks accomplishment and 
learning might happen faster, should become easier for crs, and make the agent more 
reliable. 
We think that CTS' model could be helpful as an instrument to sustain cognitive 
scientists and neuroscientists in their research by producing testable hypotheses which can be 
analyzed to either confirm or deny sorne human cognition theories. We have shown a 
combination of continuous (implicit) and symbolic (explicit) models as a powerful paradigm 
which will open up many further avenues of research over the coming years. crs' 
architecture is partially implemented but already sustains a working model of cognition, as 
fundamentally based on Franklin's LillA architecture. We intend to run experimentations to 
evaluate improvements expected to crs behavior during astronauts' training sessions. We 
expect faster reaction times to help them not create dangerous situations (collision, etc.) 
Testing and proving aIl of the proposed models, ail their parameters, against cognition 
theories and experimental results are impossible within the timeframe of my master research. 
Since our application is a tutoring agent, performance should be evaluated on the basis of 
improvement of the tutorial actions coming From the learning mechanisms put in place. 
However, the tutoring capabiJities are still very limited in our prototype and cannot show so 
weil the potential of these Iearning mechanisms. In the pursuit of CTS project, our team plan 
to develop other important Jearning mechanisms: emotional learning, meta-cognitive 
learning, episodic learning, attention learning. Sorne of them are already underway for LIDA, 
but since our implementation differs, we cannot reuse their efforts directly. We will have to 
keep a parallel research and development effort, sharing only at the conceptual level. 
Bibliography 
Aamodt, A., and Plaza, E. (1994). Case-Based Reasoning: Foundational 
Issues,Methodological Variations, and System Approaches. Al COllllllunications, Vof. 7 NI'. 1, 
March , 39-59 
Albus, 1. S. (1991). Outline for a Theory of Intelligence. IEEE Transactions Oll 
Systems, Man and Cybemetics, Vol. 21, No. 3, May/June. 
Anderson, J.R. (1983). The Architecture of Cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Anderson, J. R., and Lebiere, C. (1998). The atomic components of thought. Mahwah, 
NJ: Erlbaum. 
Anderson, J. R., and Lebiere, C. (2003). The Newell test for a theory of cognition. 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 26, 587-640. 
Anwar, A., and Franklin, S. (2003). Sparse Distributed Memory for "Conscious" 
Software Agents. Cognitive System s Research 4:339-354. 
Baars, B. J. (1988). A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Baars, B. J. (1983). Conscious contents provide the nervolls system with coherent, 
global information. ln R.J. Davidson, G.E. Schwartz & D. Shapiro (Eds.).Consciousness & 
Seif- regulation. New York, NY: Plenum Press. 
Baars, B. 1., and FrankJin, S. (2003). How conscious experience and working memory 
interact. Trends in Cognitive Science 7: 166-172 . 
Bogner, M., Ramamurthy, u., and Franklin, S. (2000). Consciousness" and Conceptual 
Learning in a Socially Situated Agent. ln H1ll11an Cognition and Social Agent Technology, ed. 
K. DWllenfwllll. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 
95 
Bratman, M. E., David, J. 1., and Martha, E. P. (1998). Plans and resource-bounded 
practical reasoning . Computationallntelligence, vol. 4, no 4. 
Brooks, R. A (1986). A robust layered control system for a mobi le robot. IEEE 
Journal of Robotics and Automation, vol. 2, no 1, pp. 14-23. 
Cheesman, l, and Merikle, P. M. (1984). Priming with and without awareness. 
Percept. Psychophys., 36, pp. 387-395. 
Cleeremans, A (1997). Principles for implicit learning. In: Berry, D. (Ed.), How 
implicit is implicit learning? Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, pp. 195-234. 
Cleeremans, A, and Jiménez, L. (1996). Implicit cognition with the symbolic 
metaphor of mind. Theoretical and methodological issues (unpublished manuscrit). 
Cleeremans, A, and Jiménez, L. (2002). Implicit learning and consciousness: A graded 
dynamic perspective" Implicit learning and consciousness: An empirical, computational and 
philosophical consensus in the making?". French, R. M. and Cleeremans, A. (Eds.), 
Psychology Press, Hove, UK. 
Cleeremans, A., and Jiménez, L. (1998). Implicit sequence learning : The truth is in the 
details. In M. A Handbook ofImplicit Learning. Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, pp. 323­
364. 
Curran, T., and Keele, S. W. (1993). Attentional and nonattentional forms of sequence 
learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 19, 189­
202. 
Davis, D. N. (2002). Architectures of cognitive and a-life agents. Neural, Emergent 
and Agent Technology Research Group. Department of Computer Science ,University of 
Hull: Kingston-upon-Hull. 
Dienes, Z., and Berry, D. C. (1997). Implicit learning: Below the subjective threshold. 
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 4, pp. 3-23. 
96 
D'Inverno, M., and Kinny, D. (1997). A FormaI Specification of dMars. In Agent 
Theories, Architectures, and Languages(Erl.), (pp. pp.155-176). 
D'Mello, S. K., Franklin, S., Ramamurthy, u., Baars,B. J. (2006). A Cognitive Science 
Based Machine Learning Architecture. AAAI 2006 Spring Symposiurn Series. Ameri-can 
Associationfor Artificiallntelligence, Stanford University, March 2006. 
Drescher, G. L. (1988). Learning from Experience Without Prior Knowledge In a 
Complicated World. Proceedings of the AAAI Symposium on Parallel Models. AAAI Press. 
Drescher, G. L. (1991). Made-Up Minds: A Constructivist Approach to Artificial 
Intelligence. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Dubois, D. (2007). Constructing an agent equipped with an artificial 
consciousness:Application to an intelligent tutoring system. PHD Thesis. 
Ebbinghaus, H. (1885). A Contribution to Experimental Psychology. Über das 
Gedchtnis. Untersuchungen zur experimentellen Psychologie. New York: Teacher College, 
Columbia University. 
Faghihi, U., Dubois, D., and Nkambou, R. (2007) Learning Mechanisms for a Tutoring 
Cognitive Agent. Proccedings of the 7th IEEE International Conference on Advanced 
Learning Technologies (ICALT 2007), July 18-20, Niigata, Japan 
Ferguson, 1. A. (1995). On the raie of DBI modeling for integrated contrai and 
coordinated behavior in autonomous agents. Applied Artificiallntelligence, 9(4). 
Franklin, S. (1995). Artificial Minds. Cambridge MA: MIT Press. 
Franklin, S. (2005). Cognitive Robots: Perceptual associative memory and learning. In 
Proceedings of the 14th Annual International Workshop on Robot and Human Interactive 
Communication (RO-MAN 2005). 
Franklin, S. (2000). Deliberation and VoJuntary Action in 'Conscious' Software 
Agents. Neural Network World 10:505-521. 
97 
Franklin, S. (2003). IDA: A Conscious Artifact. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10: 
47-66. 
Franklin, S., and Ramamurthy, 0. (2006). Motivations, Values and Emotions: Three 
Sides of the same Coin. Proceedings of the Sixth International Workshop on Epigenetic 
Robotics, Paris, France, September 2006,. 
Franklin, S., Baars, B. J., Ramamurthy, o., and Ventura, M. (2005). The RoJe of 
Consciousness in Memory. Brains, Minds and Media, (pp. 1: 1-38, pdf). 
Gilbert, C. D., Sigman, M., and Crist, R. E. (2001). The neural basis of perceptual 
learning. Neuron, 31 (5J, pp. 681-697. 
Griffiths, T. L., Baraff, E. R., and Tenenbaum, J. B. (2004). Using physical theories to 
infer hidden causal structure. Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Annual Conference of the 
Cognitive Science Society. 
Hayes-Roth, B. (1995). An architecture for adaptive intelligent systems. Artificial 
Intelligence, 72 329-365. 
Hebb, D. O. (1949). The organization ofbehavior. Wiley, New York. 
Hélie, S. (2007). Modélisation de l'apprentissage ascendant des connaissances 
explicites dans une architecture cognitive hybride. PHD Thesis, Montreal. 
Hofstadter, D. R., and Mitchell, M. (1994). The Copycat Project: A model of mental 
tluidity and analogy-making. In Advances in connectionist and neural corn putation theO/y, 
Vol. 2: logical connections, ed. K. I Holyoak, and I A. Barnden. Norwood N.I: Ablex. 
Inman, 1., and Hewitt, C. (1991). DAI Betwixt and Between: From "Intelligent 
Agents" to Open Systems Science. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics. 
Nov.lDec. 1991. 
Jackson, J. V. (1987). Idea for a Mind. Siggart Newsletter, 181:23-26. 
98 
Johnson, M., and Scanlon, R. (1987). Experience with a Feeling-Thinking Machine. 
Proceedings of the IEEE First International Conference on Neural Networks, San Diego. 71­
77. 
Kanerva, P. (1988). Sparse Distributed Mem ory. Cambridge MA: The MIT Press. 
Kelemen, A., Liang, Y and Franklin, S. (2002). A Comparative Study of Different 
Machine Learning Approaches for Decision Making. In Recent Advances in Sim ~tlation, 
Com putational Methods and Soft Com puting, ed. E.Mastorakis. Piraeus, Greece: WSEAS 
Press. 
Lebiere c., Wallach, D. and Taatgen, N. (1998). Implicit and explicit learning in ACT­
R. In F.E. Ritter & R.M. Young (Eds.), Proceedings of the Second European Conference on 
Cognitive Modelling (ECCM-98), pp. 183-189. Nottingham: Nottingham University Press. 
Maes, P. (1989). How to do the right thing. Connection Science 1:291-323. 
Marcel, A. (1983). Conscious and unconscious perception: an approach to the relations 
between phenomenal experience and perceptual processes. Cognitive Psychology, (pp. 15, 
238-300.). 
McCauley, L., and Franklin, S. (2002). A Large-Scale Multi-Agent System for Navy 
Personnel Distribution. Connection Science 14:371-385. 
Miyake, A., and Shah, P. (1999). Models ofWorking Memory. Cambridge. Cambridge 
University Press. 
Negatu, A., and Franklin, S. (2002). An action selection mechanism for 'conscious' 
software agents. Cognitive Science Quarterly 2:363-386. 
Newell, A. (1990). Unified Theory of Cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
Nkambou, R., Belghith, K,. and Kabanza, F. (2006). An Approach to Intelligent 
Training on a Robotic Simulator using an Innovative Path-Planner. LNCS No.4053, pp. 645­
99 
654, Springer-Verlag, Berlin.: Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Intelligent 
Tutoring Systems (lTS'2006). 
Reber, A.S. (1989). Implicit learning and tacit knowledge. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General, 118,219-235. 
Schulz, L. E., and Sommerville, J. (2006). Causal Determinism and Preschoolers' 
Causal Inferences, Child Development. 77(2), 427-442. 
Selfridge, O. G. (1959). Pandemonium: A Paradigm for Learning. In: Proceedings of 
the Symposium on Mechanisation of Thought Process. National Physics Laboratory. 
S!oman, A. (2001). Evolvable Biologically Plausible Visual. The University of 
Birmingham. School of Computer Science. 
Sloman, A. (1995). Exploring Design Space and Niche Space. Proceedings 5th 
Scandinavian Conf on AI, Trondheim May 1995, Amsterdam: 105 Press. 
Sioman, A., and Chrisley, R. (2003). VirtuaJ machines and consciousconsciousness. In 
Journal ofConsciousness Studies, voUO, nos (4-5), pp. 133-172. 
Sun, R. (2004). Philosophical Psychology. Desiderata for cognitive architectures, 17, 
341-. 
Turing, A. M. (1936). On computable numbers with an application to the 
Entscheidugsproblem. Proceedings of the Mathematical Society: Série 2, 42, 230-265. 
Vidal, H. J., and José, M. (2006). From Rational to Emotional Agents. Proceedings of 
the AAAI Workshop on Cognitive Modeling and Agent-based Social Simulation. 
Wolfgang, S. (2002). Stochastic Independence between Recognition and Completion 
of Spatial Patterns as a Function of Causal Interpretation. In Proceedings of the 24th Annual 
Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. 
Wooldridge, M. (1999.). « Intelligent Agents ». Dans Weiss, G., editor: Multiagent 
Systems,. 
100 
Zhang, Z., Franklin, S., Wan, Y. O. B., and Graesser, A. (1998). Natural Language 
Sensing for Autonomous Agents. ln Proceedings of IEEE International Joint Sym posia on 
Intellgence System s 98. 
URLl. (2007). blog.peltarion.com. 
